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This thesis project applies the second-order framework to compare levels of elections in 
Spain. I pay special interest to the link between the country’s electoral timing, territorial 
cleavages, and central-regional dynamic. The project implements two tests, one to measure vote 
choice in relation to general election expectations and cycles, and another to measure voter 
volatility between first- and second-order levels. Both tests are broken down by regional 
electorates and applied to elections to the European Parliament and regional assemblies. In light 
of the varying levels of decentralization found among Spanish regions, I expect test results to 
vary between regions that are more and less devolved from the center. I also hypothesize that 
European-level data will more strongly adhere to second-order expectations due to the 
differential of power between the two types of legislative bodies. My principal finding is that, 
from a second-order lens, most of Spain’s voting behavior in European Parliament elections can 
be explained. In contrast, irregular voting patterns indicate a detachment of voter logic between 
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 Spain is a young democracy on solid footing. It is widely deemed as a successful, if not 
exemplar, political case for its non-violent and relatively swift passage of the 1978 Constitution. 
Besides the attempted coup in February 1981, internal political strife has been minimal, with the 
major exception of terrorist violence from the Basque Country (País Vasco). While it is singular 
in its sometimes violent nature, the Basque Country’s relationship with the central government 
in Madrid represents the clash of regional and central issues that characterize Spanish politics. 
But not even well-represented diverse interests within its borders delayed its early democratic 
course. Political development in Spain has been both peaceful and punctuated by center-
periphery issues.  
 What makes Spain’s regional political structure exceptional has roots in its democratic 
formation. The quick approval of the Constitution demonstrated both consensus and purposeful 
omission. The constitutional drafters left for their progeny to decide what they could not agree 
upon: arrangement of sub-state institutions. The result has been unequal devolution within a 
single state: the Estado de las Autonomías or State of Autonomies. It is an arrangement of 
seventeen regions or Autonomous Communities (ACs), each distinctive in regards to its 
formation and relationship with the central tier (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 134). 
  No two regions coordinate with the center, raise and allocate taxes, and otherwise 
arrange political institutions in the exact same manner or degree. This stems, in part, from social 
differences among the regions themselves. They have unique cultures, histories, and economic 
concerns. Some regions have their own language and national identities; others are barely 
distinguishable from the homogenous, unitary state lionized by Franco. In place of established 
institutions, each region deals with the central government separately, on a bilateral basis 
(Rodden 2004, 491).  
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 Spain’s deep territorial divides are well known, and their effect on voting behavior and 
party performance is manifest in election results. But this is often attributed to social, not 
institutional, divisions. Only rarely has its peculiar multi-level arrangement been examined as a 
determining factor of voting behavior across those levels. Uneven decentralization in Spain 
provides a unique opportunity to compare inter-level elections: since it is a single state, most 
electoral and countrywide variables are held constant while degrees of decentralization vary 
across regions. Interstate make-up of sub-state institutions, on the other hand, is increasingly 
becoming more distinct from each other (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 7). The difficulty of 
navigating different states’ decentralized institutions such as tax structures also make it prudent 
to focus on single-country studies (Rodden 2004, 495).  
 Two sets of authors have assessed Spanish voting behavior in light of its decentralized 
character: Jeffery and Hough in 2003 and Pallarés and Keating in 2006. They analyze voting 
behavior based on hypotheses rooted in the second-order framework. The second-order election 
(SOE) model anchors its analysis on the countrywide, first-order election: second-order voting 
behavior references the first-order arena. The studies that examine Spain conclude that elections 
in some regions exhibit more “second-orderness” than others. This thesis updates the strategies 
utilized by Jeffery and Hough to gauge Spain’s fit to the second-order framework. I expect that 
degrees of decentralization, like regional identity, are a source of Spain’s dissimilar inter-level 
election results. In other words, strong territorial divisions interact with political institutions to 




This thesis first reviews second-order literature and expectations, and follows with a 
discussion on the strategies to test for second-order effects. The analyses of these tests focus on 
the differences between election levels as well as between regions. Regions are grouped 
according to their rate and extent of autonomy from the center. Thus, before any tests are 
applied, I re-establish the institutional asymmetry present in Spain’s regional arrangement. Its 
unequal devolution is manifest at the formation of the State of the Autonomies and in its system 
of regional finance, and, as we will see, this division between regions is mildly reflected in the 
updated test results.  
The test results draw a more stark contrast between elections on different levels—the 
European Parliament (EP) and the regional assemblies. This supports second-order research: the 
power discrepancy between the EP and most other offices make it particularly dependent on 
first-order circumstance. An enumeration of the powers and actors of Spain’s multi-level 
institutions reaffirm these findings: the central parliament has first-order supremacy, followed by 
the regional parliaments whose powers outnumber those of the EP. So while regional elections 
exhibit second-order characteristics, they do so to a slighter degree and in a less consistent 
manner than the EP elections. In other words, the EP elections show greater dependence on the 
first-order arena, while regional elections reflect a more detached voting logic. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Do regional or European elections in Spain reflect second-order expectations? Do 
election results and second-order effects vary with devolution, by level of election, or both? The 
approach of this thesis is to re-examine Spain using expected vote share and the index of 
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dissimilarity. I expect some regions in Spain to better fit the second-order model than others, 
depending on electoral timing and what Jeffery and Hough call territorial heterogeneity (2003, 
210). Regional election voting behavior, taken as a whole, will reflect greater voter autonomy 
from first-order elections than elections to the European Parliament. 
 
Literature Review 
The Second-Order Framework 
Political theories abound regarding all facets of elections. The formation of the 
European Union (EU) has produced a relatively new vein of inquiry into elections: those that 
occur in multi-level systems. What defines the dynamic between elections on different levels? 
Do elections on one level simply replicate those on another level, or do they differ 
fundamentally? In 1980, Reif and Schmitt found that differences vary across systems, but an 
electorate does not behave equally across levels. One level holds prominence over others: the 
countrywide contest. 
They coined the term “second-order” election to describe the EU's first election to the 
European Parliament (EP). Second-order elections also include regional and municipal elections, 
or any others conducted “below” the countrywide level; however, the same status is given to EU 
elections because they are considered less crucial in the eyes of the electorate and political parties. 
The elections themselves are conducted on a countrywide basis but the offices they determine are 
secondary to the offices of first-order elections. Second-order elections appoint representatives 
for lesser offices, outside the countrywide “main arena” which controls countrywide 
policymaking (Reif and Schmitt 1980).  
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The significance of placing elections into “orders” is the first-order’s influence on the 
second-order. More generally, “multi-level electoral systems are characterized by the fact that 
different elections are not independent but are related to one another” (van der Eijk and Schmitt 
2008, 5). Both voters and parties base their political logic from a countrywide standpoint: first-
order calculations are needed to rate second-order options (Reif and Schmitt 1980, 9). All 
second-order events follow, and are defined by, their first-order counterparts. Disentangling the 
second from the first order becomes difficult because they share a political system. In a broader 
sense, Reif and Schmitt emphasize the inability of voters to separate first- from second-order 
decisions because both reflect “the political situation of the first-order arena” (Reif 1984, 8). 
This includes the nearness (in time) of a first-order election, the partisan make-up of the 
government, and its current concentration of political power. 
Lower Turnout and Government Parties Lose 
Given that outcomes vary across cases, second-order elections all share particular 
characteristics that distinguish them from first-order elections. First, overall turnout is low. 
Compared to first-order elections, fewer voters turn out to vote in the first place since the 
offices to be determined at a second-order election are less important to them. Second, minor 
parties fare better than governing ones. Of the voters who participate in second-order elections, 
more tend to disfavor parties in government at the first-order level. Opposition parties, small 
and regional parties experience an increase of their vote share, while the party (or coalition) in 
government gathers fewer votes vis-à-vis the countrywide election.1 Voters can express 
                                                 
 
1 In a follow-up to the original article, Reif updates their definition of “small parties” to include radical, protest, and 
populist parties. Their common characteristic is the relative lack of resources that large, established parties engage 
during election campaigns (1997, 118). 
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displeasure with the incumbent government party, preference for a weaker party, or at once 
punish one and reward the other. All paths result in a lower vote share for the countrywide 
governing party (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Again, this follows from the logic that voters place less 
value on a second-order vote: they are more willing to take risks and vote “against” the central 
governing party and “for” alternative parties.  
 Reif and Schmitt tested for lower turnout and government punishment effects after the 
first European Parliament election. They examined voter participation and partisan vote share 
simply by comparing data from the EP election with that of the closest countrywide election in 
member countries. They found without exception that turnout was lower in the EP election. In 
seven out of eight cases, governing parties lost while minor parties gained support (1980, 16, 19). 
Their explanation of the apparent change in voter preference underscores the “less-at-stake 
dimension,” or the lower salience of second-order elections in the minds of voters. Voters are 
less likely to participate in the first place and, when they do, the governing party suffers (1980, 9). 
Degrees of Second Order 
 The ensuing research on second-order elections reveal that second-order characteristics 
vary by intensity. Any change in “the stakes” or circumstance of a second-order election affects 
its outcome. Timing matters. Studies in American congressional elections have long underscored 
cyclical effects. Midterm elections have a distinct flavor from elections held on the same day as 
the presidential elections. Voters “punish” governing parties most midterm (Reif and Schmitt 
1980, 10). This highlights the simple fact that “the likelihood of disappointing voters is much 
higher for parties in charge of government than for those in opposition” (Schmitt 2005, 652), 
but researchers have proposed several other causes of the midterm lull in government support.  
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 Protest, expressive, instrumental, and strategic voting are all terms coined to explain this 
phenomenon. During midterms, voters feel free to express their displeasure with the party in 
power without risking its stability. They are more prone to experiment with parties more closely 
aligned with their true preferences than cast a strategic vote for a larger, better established party. 
The few explanations of why a voter would vote for a smaller party repeat the same theme with 
a different vocabulary: a voter chooses a party closest to his or her preferences, the small party is 
relatively closest to a voter’s preferences in an ideological or issue space, or the voter is voting 
expressively (Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 58; Marsh 1998, 594; Norris 1997, 12). 
 Whatever the reason, evidence strongly demonstrates that voters disfavor the governing 
party(ies) most frequently when the temporal distance between first- and second-order elections 
is greatest. The government penalty effect is well established in both European and American 
politics. The distinction of the former is the presence of minor parties that may penalize the 
opposition as well as the governing parties (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 79). For many studies 
applying the second-order framework to European cases, minor parties’ gains in relative vote 
share surpass those of the opposition party (Jeffery and Hough 2003; Hough and Jeffery 2006). 
Like timing, election type varies. All non-countrywide elections are not equal: some are 
more “secondary” than others. Voters consider the main arena to be on the countrywide level 
because of the relative responsibilities assigned there. Simultaneously, voter attention lessens for 
elections and offices that exhibit weaker political influence. Reif and Schmitt focus on two very 
different levels of elections in this regard: while countrywide elections determine who will form 
government, the functional design of the EU relegates EP elections to a particularly secondary 
status. Though the EP is directly elected, the Commission and Council of Ministers are 
appointed by countrywide parliaments, ensuring that “national institutions continue to retain the 
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primary responsibility” of governing the European Union (Norris 1997, 114). In second-order 
language, the first-order political arena remains countrywide (not Union- or region-wide) simply 
because it wields the most political power. And powerful offices draw more people to the poll 
booth and monopolize their voting logic. 
Some offices at a secondary level, however, approach the political prowess of the 
countrywide level. Assuming this changes the salience of that secondary office, it engenders 
change in voting behavior. Indeed, the more responsibility assigned to an office, the less 
secondary its elections appear. Heath, et al. contrast partisan choice in EP and local elections in 
Great Britain and conclude that European elections exhibit more second-order characteristics 
than local elections (1999). This follows the logic of Reif and Schmitt’s original article: as stakes 
increase, secondary results decrease. Voters base their local and EP vote choice on countrywide-
level issues and government performance, but this effect is less pronounced in local elections.  
Heath, et al. gather data from the British Election Panel Survey (BEPS) as preliminary 
evidence of the hierarchy voters assign to different levels of elections. The most voters turn out 
for countrywide elections, fewer for local elections, and the fewest for EP elections; this ranking 
is maintained throughout the study. Eighty-two percent of respondents claimed they cared a 
great deal about which party won in the countrywide election, but that number drops to 62% for 
local and 45% for EP elections. Similarly, 86% felt it made a difference who won the 
countrywide election, while 71% and 56% thought it made a difference at the local and EP 
elections, respectively (1999, 393). 
They conclude that countrywide-level issues remain the most influential, but do not 
dominate local elections as much as European ones. The stakes are high enough in local 
elections for at least one subset of voters to create a second-order voting calculus distinct from 
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the first order. In turn, they are more likely to deviate from their vote decision at the 
countrywide level (1999, 406). According to the BEPS survey, 47.6% of those that switched 
votes named local issues as the reason for the change (1999, 408): almost half of split-ticket 
voters consciously identify their behavior as context-specific. Again, not all second-order 
elections exist on a single level: local British elections appear to be “one-and-three-quarter order” 
relative to elections to the European Parliament (1999, 409). The stakes are higher in local 
elections, whether that causes or is caused by a level-specific voting calculus.  
Type and timing of second-order elections affect ballot-splitting and turnout because 
they affect the stakes of an election. Second-order effects do not feature as prominently at local 
British as European elections, but this follows Reif and Schmitt’s main assumption that the level 
of stakes designates the “order” of any given election. Not only do stakes differ according to 
district (such as local versus EU-wide), stakes can change from year to year in the same kind of 
election. For example, over the course of the first several EP elections, lower turnout paralleled 
a regular decline in government support. Second-order effects can change over time even within 
the same type of election (Marsh 1998, 597-599). 
Further complicating matters, the degree of first-order influence also varies among 
countries and their respective political makeup and actors (Reif 1997, 117). Parties can raise the 
stakes of elections by campaigning and raising awareness in the media, although it can have the 
adverse effect of underscoring that less really is at stake, such as highlighting the limited powers 
of the EP (Norris 1997, 114; Reif 1997, 118). And other factors complicate the task of isolating 
second-order effects from others during any given election cycle. “The rise of new parties, the 
disappearance of old ones and various temporary and permanent amalgamations” make 




 Jeffery and Hough combined two strategies to test for second-order effects in their 
adaptation of the second-order framework in their article titled Regional Elections in Multi-Level 
Systems (2003), and again in a chapter of Devolution and Electoral Politics (119-156, 2006). 
They explore cyclical effects using a popularity-curve or “Dinkel’s” test, which they also apply to 
Germany. They employ the index of dissimilarity to examine territorial effects. Both techniques 
had been used previously for cross-level, but not necessarily second-order, analyses. The tests 
are described as “top down” and “bottom up,” respectively. Both are “vertical” analyses that 
compare regional and national levels (2003).  
 They purposively incorporate these rather simple analytical tools to “locate starting 
points for the comparative analysis of electoral dynamics in multi-level systems” (2003, 200). 
Their aim is to introduce these tests as initial rubrics for understanding partisan vote share. Their 
main research question is basic: it asks whether or not the second-order model applies to Spain 
and Germany. This encompasses numerous questions on the subordination of regional to 
countrywide elections, but the core of Jeffery and Hough’s investigation was the respective 
relationships between elections on different levels concerning government, opposition, and 
regional parties (2003).  
Cyclical Effects: Dinkel’s Curve 
 Jeffery and Hough’s top-down analysis begins with a discussion of regional elections as 
second-order elections, and emphasizes the less-at-stake dimension. Like Reif and Schmitt 
before them, they turn to Dinkel’s work in electoral cycles literature (Dinkel 1977). In 1977, 
Dinkel’s simple litmus test illustrated second-order patterns in multi-level elections before 
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“second-order” language existed. He proposed, and demonstrated, that parties controlling the 
federal government fared poorly in midterm Länder elections in Germany.  
 The test is straightforward: party performance in regional elections is calculated by 
“expected vote share,” or the average vote share of the two federal elections before and after a 
given Land election. For example, if a party received 48% of a region’s vote share for a federal 
election in 2000, and 52% in 2004, then its expected vote share for any Land election between 
2000 and 2004 would be 50%. The only explanatory variable is timing, and the average 
somewhat controls for actual change in voter preference between countrywide elections (an 
option unavailable to Reif and Schmitt, who were restricted to one EP election) (Jeffery and 
Hough 2001, 80).  
 Dinkel compared the expected vote share to actual Länder results and confirmed that 
the federal party in power invariably received fewer votes than expected. Whether or not the 
party formed a Land’s government or opposition did not matter. But timing of a regional 
election in the federal electoral cycle corresponded to a predictable pattern of punishment 
effects (Reif 1997, 115; Jeffery and Hough 2001, 80). Dinkel concluded that “federal 
government parties did not just underperform in Länder elections, they underperformed most at 
midterm” (Jeffery and Hough 2001, 80). This resonates both with Reif and Schmitt’s second-
order framework and congressional studies in American politics. 
 Jeffery and Hough revisit German election results through 1990 and plot the relative 
vote, or the actual vote as a percentage of the expected vote, along a timeline between 
countrywide elections. For government parties, this created a “parabola” of support, its nadir 
precisely halfway between federal elections, with rates of support increasing as Länder elections 
approached federal election dates (2001, 82). And while opposition parties performed relatively 
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better midterm, they did not quite gain as much as the government party lost. Small parties 
benefited the most, surpassing their expected vote share by 50% at midterms. The authors 
conclude that opposition parties suffer from small parties “[mopping] up dissatisfied supporters 
of both federal government and federal opposition in the Länder, before being squeezed again at 
the next federal election” (2001, 83-84). 
 In unified Germany, small parties continued to perform well, and government parties 
continued to lose, during midterms. Opposition support, however, was more erratic after 1990, 
only vaguely following a trend. Although opposition vote share performed better than expected, 
it experienced a loss of support from the federal election (Jeffery and Hough 2001, 89; 2003, 
202; 2006, 135). So why are cyclical effects dampened for opposition parties? Jeffery and Hough 
posit that small parties have been gaining support because of greater regional focus.  
 Small parties may appeal to specific Länder issues, conduct large-scale anti-establishment 
advertising campaigns, or have a charismatic regional leader (2001, 91-92; 2006, 135). Their gains 
are now made at the expense of both the government and opposition. These strategies are 
successful due to changes in Germany’s multi-level arrangements. Post-unification, the party 
system has become more regionally diverse and the federal system more “competitive,” 
displaying “more distinctive policy portfolios” (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 132). Germany 
diversified its regions by physically gaining more territory and thus raising the salience of 
Länder-specific issues. 
Territorial Divisions: The Index of Dissimilarity 
 Territorial cleavages lie at the heart of multi-level change; they exist “when a self-
conscious minority is concentrated” within a state’s territory (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 2). 
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Multi-tiered governance rarely exists without some internal territorial divisions—its existence is 
to coordinate discordant interests of the regions and center (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 11). 
Jeffery and Hough suggest that territorial cleavages diversify voting behavior, which disrupts 
second-order patterns of cyclical support (2003, 206-211).  
 How does voting behavior change with increases in territorial cleavages? Jeffery and 
Hough expect that volatility of partisan support between regional and countrywide levels will 
increase. To demonstrate voting disparity between electoral levels, they turn to the index of 
dissimilarity, which measures change in vote share. Jeffery and Hough chart indices of Länder 
votes for pre- and post-unification in Germany. Consistent with their argument, election results 
are more “homogenous” before unification and more diverse afterward (2003, 202). Not only 
has voting behavior changed along the electoral cycle but also between electoral levels.  
  Like Dinkel’s expected vote share, the index of dissimilarity is a simple calculation: “it 
expresses the proportion of the electorate who would have to change their vote in order for the 
provincial election result to be converted into the national one” (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 209). 
It calculates net dissimilarity for regions within a state, with the federal election usually serving as 
the basis of comparison. Unlike expected vote—which uses an average of two countrywide 
elections—the index contrasts results of one regional election against the countrywide federal 
election. Sequence of the elections does not matter: the nearness of the elections is most 
important to better control exogenous effects (Johnston 1980, 155).  
 Adopted by Johnston to compare provincial and federal voting in Canada, the index 
serves as a resource to track trends across both time and regions. After charting indices for all 
federal elections and provinces, he found that each Canadian province had a unique inter-level 
voting history. Vote shares changed at different times and rates, and the convergence between 
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provincial and federal levels expanded for some regions and not for others. Results from 
Quebec’s and British Columbia’s elections “differed radically between levels” and from those of 
other provinces (1980, 159). There was little resemblance between electoral levels within a 
province; few similar patterns emerged between provinces as a whole. 
 Like Jeffery and Hough’s conclusion regarding modern Germany, Johnston proposes 
that Canada’s disaggregated party system and dual federal system encourage high rates of 
dissimilarity (1980). Canada’s extreme countrywide-substate divergence stands out even among 
other strong federal states (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 11). Canada serves as an exemplar of 
decentralized systems: inter-level coordination between parties on different levels is nominal, 
and laws passed in Ottawa are largely ineffective without provincial approval (Wolinetz and 
Carty 2006, 54). Overlapping jurisdictions often require intergovernmental negotiations that 
cumulate in formal contracts between levels (Rodden 2004, 491). It is no wonder that the index 
of dissimilarity was first adapted to the Canadian case, in a country whose provincial-federal 
dichotomy is so sharply defined. 
 How does this trend hold across different countries? Are dissimilarity indices 
correspondingly lower in countries that have less fragmented party and federal systems? 
Research so far confirms this correlation. German divergence has increased post-unification, but 
its federal system does not reach Canadian proportions. Accordingly, Canadian dissimilarity 
values far surpass their German counterparts. Modern index scores in Germany, in turn, surpass 
those of Austria (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 129). While Austria has experienced a trend towards 
divergence in recent decades, its federal system remains relatively centralized. Compared to 
Germany, federal legislative powers are more concentrated and regional interests are represented 
by a weak upper house (Abedi and Siaroff 2006, 158-159).  
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 Of course, of particular interest is Spain, which does not have a formal federal system 
but is undoubtedly decentralized. Two sets of authors calculate its indices of dissimilarity, which 
fall somewhere between those of pre-unification Germany and Canada (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 
129). Pallarés and Keating take an extra step in calculating dissimilarity in Spain by also 
measuring the volatility between elections of the same type (2006, 113). Like Jeffery and Hough, 
they find Spain’s historic nationalities to exhibit the largest degrees of dissimilarity between 
levels (Pallarés and Keating 2006, 111; Jeffery and Hough 2003, 210). Neither article finds that 
to be idiosyncratic but consistent with Spain’s lopsided regional set-up. Jeffery and Hough 
describe it as territorial heterogeneity (2003, 210); Pallarés and Keating emphasize both the party 
system’s “territorialisation” and the central government’s failure to minimize power disparity 
among its regions (2006, 98-100).  
Decentralization, Devolution, and Federalism 
 Regionally homogenous states experience low rates of split-ticket voting between levels. 
The influence of territorial cleavages on Dinkel’s test and the dissimilarity index is indirect: 
territorial divisions per se do not affect voting behavior. Their influence is mainly expressed 
through social traditions and political institutions. On the institutional side, research has focused 
on a state’s adoption of territorial cleavages in its constitution and party system.  
 How a constitution interprets territorial issues first depends on whether those issues are 
addressed at all. A unitary state necessarily does not institutionalize regional interests; multi-level 
governance by definition addresses them to a certain degree. Strength of regional institutions has 
a wide range among multi-level governments. Degrees of decentralization, devolution, and 
federalism all vary. Although these three terms appear to be used interchangeably, they have 
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distinct definitions. Decentralization refers to distribution of power: it is simply “a shift of 
authority towards local governments and away from central governments” (Rodden 2004, 482). 
Rodden is careful to point out that central governments do not necessarily give up authority. 
Instead, powers newly extended to regional governments often overlap with those of the center. 
This intersection of power creates challenges when isolating regional from central political 
arenas (2004, 482-489).  
 Inversely, Chhibber and Kollman use the term “provincialization” in place of 
decentralization because the latter emphasizes action of the center, when in reality authority 
shifts tend to be unintended consequences of other political changes (2004, 102). Devolution, on 
the other hand, is a result of the central government granting decision-making and administrative 
powers to sub-state units. But the difference between decentralization and devolution is 
nuanced: devolution is decentralizing institutional reform. This is often codified in constitutional 
amendments and new institutional arrangements, such as the recent creation of new regional 
assemblies in the United Kingdom. It may or may not create a new level of governance (Hough 
and Jeffery 2006, 2).  
 Federalism by definition creates distinct levels of governance. It engages sub-state units 
in policymaking on the central level. Intentionally, no single level can “unilaterally modify the 
federal structure of the state” and each level also has some final decision-making authorities 
(Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 9). A federal designation in a constitution protects the regions from 
exploitation by the center. It serves as a contract between central and sub-state levels that 
structures future interactions and power sharing between them. While decentralization describes 
an allocation of authority, federalism is a formal political institution (Rodden 2004, 489-491).  
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 What all federal systems have in common is the inter-level agreement on their structural 
relationship. Many federal states feature judicial review to adjudicate disputes between levels and 
a bicameral legislature. Often represented in the upper house, sub-state interests are thus 
guaranteed representation at the federal level. But for all the characteristics they have in 
common, federal systems spring from many molds. They range in size and number of 
constituent units. They vary in electoral rules, veto authorities, and the substantive policy areas 
assigned to each level (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 9-10).  
 And while it is often considered federal—and included in multi-country studies of 
federations—Spain is not. Unambiguously, Article 145.1 of the Constitution declares that 
“Under no circumstances shall the federation of Autonomous Communities be allowed.” While 
the powers and administration of the AC governments resemble healthy federal sub-units, 
Spain’s lack of a system of shared rule between the sub-units and the center belie any classic 
federal arrangement (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 136).   
 Chhibber and Kollman’s examination of federalism reflects Jeffery and Hough’s bottom-
up approach in that their explanatory variable is the degree of strength of regional government. 
Unlike Jeffery and Hough, the book extends its focus beyond voting patterns to the nature of 
party aggregation (2004). Both sets of authors acknowledge the sociological cleavages that 
distinguish regions from the center and from each other, but partly dismiss them as the main 
driving force behind regional party vote success.  
 Jeffery and Hough underscore that structural elements, like institutional or electoral rules, 
are deliberately set aside in their analysis but include a brief discussion on the decentralized 
Spanish state and its effect on party systems and voter behavior (2003, 210). Chhibber and 
Kollman, for the most part, hold electoral rules constant (as the countries examined all feature 
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single-member, simple plurality systems) but emphasize the role of federalism. This is not a 
complete departure from Jeffery and Hough’s article. Since party success relies directly on the 
votes it receives, application of Chhibber and Kollman’s party system analysis straightforwardly 
applies to parties’ vote shares in elections. Regional parties thrive in regions that are powerful 
while countrywide parties benefit under highly centralized states. And while Spain is not federal, 
its varying levels of devolution are expected to be reflected in the relative success of regional 
parties among its Autonomous Communities. 
 
Democratic Institutions of Spain 
 Type of political office underpins the second-order framework, because the office at 
stake changes the stakes of an election. Three types of offices are under review in this project: 
party lists compete for seats in Congress at the countrywide level, in regional (AC) parliaments, 
and in the European Parliament (EP). To gauge the first- or second-order nature of an election, 
we must first understand these offices, and the political institutions to which they belong.  
Congress: Congreso de los Diputados 
Reif and Schmitt single out countrywide parliamentary elections as the first-order 
election: all remaining types of elections—regional, municipal, by-elections, and “the like”—
belong to the second order (1980, 8). In Spain’s case, the Congreso (Congress) unambiguously fits 
the first-order description. Although officially a constitutional monarchy, Spain is functionally a 
parliamentary monarchy. The constitutional roles of the lower house also sustain its first-order 
designation: it elects the prime minister (albeit called “presidente”) and exercises full legislative 
control independent of the upper house (the Senado, whose limitations will be described in more 
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detail below). Once elected from Congress by an absolute majority (or a simple majority in a 
second vote), the prime minister forms a cabinet, oversees the various executive bodies, and has 
the power to call elections (Aja 2001, 233; Lancaster 2003; Share 2006).  
Electoral Rules 
The 350 deputies (diputados) are elected under a modified system of proportional 
representation (PR). Unlike some parliamentary systems, however, two large centrist parties 
dominate elections to Congreso: the Spanish Worker’s Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Popular 
Party (PP). Since 1982, they have together dominated overall percentage of votes in general 
elections (Michavila 2005, 4).  
It is a Duvergerian outcome without Duvergerian conditions; that is, two parties receive 
a majority of vote share and seats even in absence of a Single-Member Plurality (SMP) system. 
The Duvergerian thesis places emphasis on electoral rules when explaining party systems and 
that, specifically, an SMP electoral system is expected to create a two-party dominant party 
system, and, inversely, a PR system encourages a multi-party system. If only a single winner can 
emerge from one district, only two parties emerge as viable competitors in that district 
(Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 35-38).  
So why is Spain’s party system two-party dominant despite having a PR system? First 
and foremost, it is an adulterated PR system. Second, a small number of seats are usually won by 
other parties. In short “the Spanish electoral system facilitates a multiparty system yet does so in 
a rather distorted way” (Lancaster 2003, 357-358; Rush 2007). Its “corrected” fixed-list 
proportional system guarantees at least two deputies per district, and then assigns more using the 
D'Hondt method. Spain’s fifty districts correspond to its provinces, creating small 
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constituencies: the median district magnitude is five. Due to the two-seat minimum, provinces 
with rural or small populations are overrepresented. In a larger province, a seat is “worth” 
150,000 votes but as little as 31,000 in others (Rush 2007, 716). Indeed, the modifications of the 
PR system by the founders of the new democracy had the intent to promote both a stable two-
party system and an overrepresentation of rural provinces (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 135; 
Montero 2005, 16).  
The vote-to-seat ratio in Congreso is skewed in favor of large political parties with 
countrywide agendas since it is easier for them to accumulate seats from several small provinces. 
And once established, the dominance of the PSOE and PP leave third parties at a comparative 
disadvantage: in the 2008 election, the two parties garnered 84% of the vote and 92% of the 
seats. Rush calculates that if one party simply won all the “cheap seats”  in the smallest districts, 
it would hold 50.57% of congressional seats but only represent 40.55% of Spain’s population. In 
the 2000 general election, the PP won a majority of seats without a majority vote (Rush 2007, 
716). This translates into disproportional congressional voting power, allowing a majority 
government to avoid coalitions even without a majority of the votes. But the more common 
occurrence in the case of minority governments is that non-countrywide parties (NCWPs) hold a 
key number of seats, despite the PR system’s “strongly majoritarian tendencies” (van Biezen and 
Hopkin 2006, 24). 
Political Parties 
 Since 1982, the balance of power in Congress has favored either the center-left PSOE or 
center-right PP. The PSOE is the social democratic party revived from Spain’s short-lived 
Second Republic (1931-1936) and served as the opposition party in the initial years of the new 
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democracy. After winning the 1982 election, it enjoyed fourteen successive years as the majority 
party between 1982 and 1996. The uninterrupted stint in power, however, coincided with PSOE 
party members’ patronization of state-owned industries and corruption. By 1993 it failed to win 
enough seats to rule on its own. After years of media-reported government scandal, it was no 
surprise when the center-right PP won in 1996 with a plurality of votes. Although the extent of 
the PP victory over the PSOE was not as extreme as predicted (often referred to as a “bitter 
victory, sweet defeat”), the PP went on to win the 2000 with an absolute majority (Balfour 1996, 
331). The PSOE rebounded in the 2004 and 2008 elections, winning 164 and 169 congressional 
seats (out of 350), respectively. 
 Until its 1996 win, the progress of the PP was hampered by the lack of a conservative 
tradition in Spain and suspicions it had not completely severed its Francoist ties (Gilmour 2006, 
26; Pallarés and Keating 2006, 99). In the early stages of democracy, it was known as the Alianza 
Popular, or Popular Alliance, which in 1979 ran with the Christian Democrats (Partido Democrata 
Popular) under the banner of the Coalición Popular. The coalition only ran under that name that 
year and was completely disbanded by 1986. In 1989, the Popular Alliance was reconstituted as 
the Popular Party. Under new leadership, it became more moderate and unified, and (coupled 
with the misdeeds of the PSOE) its makeover steered the party to its 1996 victory (del Castillo 
1996, 266; Gilmour 2006, 22-23).  
 Particularly in the minority governments of the 1990s, smaller parties have also 
participated in congressional politics. While the top two parties regularly take up over three-
fourths of the vote share, sufficient electoral room is left over for a handful of seats for third 
parties. In Spain most of those parties have been those that are regionally concentrated—
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another phenomenon facilitated by its small constituencies and two-seat minimum (Pallarés and 
Keating 2006, 103).  
 Of the smaller countrywide parties, Izquierda Unida or the United Left (IU) is the only 
one to have consistently won seats in parliament. It contains the remnants of the Partido 
Comunista Español or Spanish Communist Party, which was one of the four main parties of the 
democratic transition. Today its presence is slight, however, winning only two seats in 2008. 
That still fares better than the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD). As winners of the 1977 and 
1979 elections, it was the fourth and titular party of the democratic transition, but after those 
initial years it has been largely obsolete (Gilmour 2006, 22). After its break up in 1982, it was 
succeeded by the Centro Democrático y Social (CDS) (Aja 2001, 241), but since 1993 the CDS has 
not sent a deputy to Congress.  
 Collectively, third parties that cater to particular regions, or non-countrywide parties 
(NCWPs), have experienced much greater success than the IU or CDS. In particular, parties 
from Basque Country (País Vasco) and Catalonia (Cataluña) enjoy regular representation at the 
central level. The Convergence and Union Party of Catalonia (CiU) and the Basque Nationalist 
Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco or PNV) secured ten and six seats in the 2008 election, 
respectively. The Catalan Republican Left (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya or ERC) currently 
has three seats, and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) from Galicia and Coalición Canaria (CC) 
from the Canary Islands each have two. Of these parties, the CiU and PNV consistently hold the 
most seats on the first-order level since the first election in 1977. In practice, however, NCWPs 
do not participate in full coalition governments in the main arena. Instead, they back or oppose 
the main governing or opposition parties on a case-by-case basis. Regional parties mostly “limit 
themselves to giving parliamentary support to single-party minority governments and to agreeing 
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on parliamentary accords” (Colomer 1998, 49). Within their respective assemblies, the previously 
mentioned regional parties play an even greater role in the formation of government or 
opposition. 
Regional Parliaments: Asambleas Regionales  
 All regions replicate the institutional arrangement at the central level—a high court, 
parliament, president, and cabinet form of government—although for most regions it was not 
necessary to do so (Agranoff 1996, 387; Newton and Donaghy 1997, 131). The unicameral 
regional assembly and its executive have authority to propose laws, albeit this is limited to areas 
of law that have been ceded to them by the central government. Within the wide range of 
appropriate areas, however, regional assemblies have authority to approve and carry out 
legislation independent of the central authorities. They may also may introduce laws to Congress 
and file appeals with the Constitutional Tribunal in Madrid (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 132).  
 Activity of the regional parliaments has increasingly flourished over the years, particularly 
in the 1980s, the formative decade of the Autonomous Communities. The number of laws 
passed by regional parliaments increased dramatically, collectively passing 85% of all laws in 
Spain in 1990, in contrast to the 14% of the central government (whose share was 68% in 1981) 
(Agranoff 1996, 389-390). Regional administration has also grown rapidly: regional governments 
have developed an intricate bureaucracy that “reproduces the [central] pattern, with 
undersecretaries, director generals, and so on” that burgeoned with the onset of regional 
authority (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 134). 
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Electoral Rules  
Furthermore, all regional and local level governments adopted an electoral system nearly 
identical to the one at the countrywide level. Proportionality is often better at these levels, 
however, because there are more seats per province or municipality (Pallarés and Keating 2006, 
103). The least populated AC, La Rioja, sends four deputies to Congress but has a regional 
chamber with 33 representatives.2 Nor are regions equal or synchronized in regards to electoral 
timing. Four regional governments have the authority to call their own respective elections, but 
the remaining thirteen regions must collectively hold their AC and local elections simultaneously.  
These regional governments do not have the option to call early elections. 
Political Parties 
 Across the regional assemblies, the PSOE and PP remain primary actors, but small 
parties that fail to gain seats in central parliament are not so unlucky at the regional level. And, 
again, the regional parties that have sent deputies to Congress have an even greater presence in 
their regional assemblies, with Catalonian and Basque parties leading the way. The CiU regularly 
receives a plurality of votes in Catalonia, winning 32% in the 2006 election and averaging 39% 
since 1980. The Catalan Republican Left (ERC) garners an average 9%. Notably, in Catalonia the 
PSOE merged with the regional socialists to form the Party of the Socialists of Catalonia (PSC) 
(van Biezen and Hopkin 2006, 21-24), which is usually second to the CiU in terms of regional 
votes.  
                                                 
 
2 Even at the local and most proportional level, however, the vote-to-seat ratio can echo the disproportional 
outcomes of the countrywide level: in the 2007 local elections, the PSOE won the most seats, although they won 
fewer votes than the PP (34.9% to 35.6%, respectively) (Barreiro and Urquizo-Sancho 2007, 538). 
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Like the CiU, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) has formed the regional government 
since its first elections and has an average vote share of 34%. The Basque Solidarity party, Eusko 
Alkartasuna (EA) follows with 5%. The PNV and EA have smaller successes in the bordering 
region of Navarra. In both Catalonia and Basque Country, the PP suffers more than the PSOE 
in relative vote loss from the central level. The PP vote share averages only 8% in Catalonia and 
12% in Basque Country, while the PSOE averages 29% and 21%, respectively.  
 The vote is more evenly split among the PSOE, PP, and CC in the Canary Islands (with 
vote shares of 35%, 24%, and 24% in the 2007 AC election, respectively). In Galicia, the PP has 
won with an average of 50% of vote share over the last five regional elections, a comfortable 
margin over the PSOE (26%) and BNG (20%). Across the regions, other prominent political 
parties with regional representation are numerous; however, many parties or coalitions have 
been short-lived. Others have been more successful, and have established a regional presence for 
at least the past fifteen years: Partido Andalucista (PA), Partido Aragones (PAR), Chunta Aragonesista 
(CHA), Partido Regionalista de Cantabria (PRC), Extremadura Unida (EU), Convergencia de Demócratas 
de Navarra (CDN), Partido Riojano (PR), Unión Valenciana (UV), Partido Socialista de Mallorca-Entesa 
(PSM-EN), and Unión Mallorquina (UM). These last two parties are named for the largest of the 
Balearic Islands, while the remaining parties’ regions are reflected in their respective names.  
European Parliament 
 The functions of the EP are numbered, and bear little resemblance to the countrywide 
and regional level institutions. The EP does not form a government, cannot introduce or enact 
laws, has only shared power over the budget, and is unable to raise funds. Certainly, its powers 
have steadily increased over the lifespan of the EU, and it works in collaboration with the 
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Commission and Council of Ministers in various capacities. It also holds several negative powers 
and institutional checks over other EU institutions (McCormick 1999, 101-107; Schmitt 2005, 
652-654). Despite the steady evolution of its powers, however, its role still diverges from that of 
any European countrywide government.  
Electoral Rules 
Since becoming a member of the European Union in 1986, Spanish constituents have 
voted in six European Parliament elections which have been held as countrywide elections. 
Spain continues to use a closed-list proportional representation system. This system allows 
parties the greatest control over candidates: candidate selection in Spain is also centralized (Hix 
2004, 196-202). Like all elections, Spain verifies results through the Junta Electoral Central and 
allocates seats according to the d’Hondt rule. For the most part, Spanish EP election procedures 
reflect those most commonly exercised by EU member states (del Castillo 1996, 260).  
Political Parties 
Spain’s political parties have a history of pro-European attitudes (del Castillo 1996, 252). 
In the EP, the PSOE is included in the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the PP in the 
European People’s Party (EPP). Delegates from both Spanish parties have had success in the 
ranks of the larger parties: the PES chair is a former PSOE leader, and two PP members have 
been secretary generals in the EPP (Hanley 2006, 160). Since the country acts as a single 
constituency, this poses a number of problems for regional parties, who have difficulty obtaining 
enough votes to send a single member to the EP. Most resort to forming “rather artificial 
alliances” (Pallarés and Keating 2006, 104). In addition, small parties are often squeezed out of 
the larger European parties, as was the case with the PNV being displaced by the PP in the 
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European People’s Party (Hanley 2006, 161). (The norm of only allowing one political party per 
country into an EP party, however, eases the difficulty of comparing party performance on 
multiple levels.) The PSOE and PP took all but six of the 50 Spanish EP seats in 2009 (five out 
of 54 in 2004 and thirteen out of 64 in 1999). Although these numbers “punch somewhere 
around their true weight” on the countrywide level, they are achieved with joint lists formed 
from broad alliances (Hanley 2006, 162). 
The “Orders” of Multi-level Elections 
 Elections to the Congress, regional assemblies, and European Parliament share 
important similarities: all use a similar PR system and the same political parties participate on all 
three levels, albeit with varied coalitions and degrees of success. These commonalities alleviate 
the institutional-procedural complications in studying elections across multiple countries (Reif 
and Schmitt 1980, 12). The disparity of power between the parliaments, however, is distinct. The 
functions of Congress are far more substantial than those of the EP, and, to a lesser extent, the 
regional parliaments. Consistent with the second-order framework, the elections to the central 
parliament are of the “first order”: most plainly, it controls the countrywide budget, determines 
government, and creates policies with “binding consequences” (Reif and Schmitt 1980, 8; Norris 
1997, 115).  
 Although the powers of the EP and regional parliaments are both weaker than those of 
Congress, they are by no means equal to each other. Most activity emanating from the EP is 
controlled through other EU bodies and its lawmaking ability is limited to making co-decisions 
or recommendations. In contrast, regional assemblies have a robust set of laws they have 
approved and carried out (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 124). In second-order language, the 
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stakes are higher in a regional versus EP election. In sum, EP elections are expected to exhibit 
the most second-order characteristics because their stakes are lowest. European Parliament 
electoral outcomes hinge on the timing and previous results of the first-order arena. The 
relatively higher stakes in a regional election dilute any corresponding second-order effects. 
 
The Emergence of Autonomous Communities 
 While all regional assemblies have a second-order level somewhere between that of 
Congress and the EP, it would be disingenuous to treat them all the same. Again, one of the 
most defining characteristics of Spanish political institutions is the relationship between Madrid 
and the regions. Regarding the central-regional power structure, the Constitution created what 
many refer to as “asymmetric federalism” that “is a confusing and often contradictory 
arrangement” (Share 2006, 263). And even though it is often classified as a federal system and it 
has many federal features, Spain is not so officially. Under Franco, the centralized state 
controlled the various municipalities, which executed decrees directly from Madrid. During the 
democratic transition after his death, drafters of the Constitution avoided establishing concrete 
regional divisions. Instead, they included constitutional articles which allowed a region to come 
forward and form its own AC, with central parliament’s approval of its Statute of Autonomy 
into organic law (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 134). 
The seventeen official Autonomous Communities in Spain today all completed the 
“autonomic” process by 1983. Spain’s devolution is notable in two ways: overtime, it has only 
increased the powers of regional governments, and the rate of devolution is markedly different 
among the regions. The Constitution defines which legal areas are exclusively under the control 
of the powers in Madrid, otherwise leaving open what other powers may be transferred to the 
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AC governments. In practice, and regardless of their starting point, all ACs have increased 
autonomy over time but have not always maximized the authorized powers within their grasp 
(Colomer 1998, 47). 
Fast-Track and Slow-Track Regions 
 Scholars generally lump ACs into two groups: those that took the fast- or slow-track 
methods. Only Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia were awarded rapid routes to autonomy. 
Cultural differences aside, they are the only three regions in the pre-civil war period in which 
autonomous referendums had passed. This uniquely qualified them to ascend to autonomy with 
relatively few requirements, and they are referred to under a special provision in the Constitution. 
Their two-step process required that their Statutes of Autonomy be approved by Congress and 
by a regional referendum. Basque Country and Catalonia held their first AC elections in March 
of 1980, followed by Galicia in October 1981. 
A second “fast-track” or “rapid route” procedure, however, was enacted for Andalusia 
after much public protest in the region. The slogan that arose from these demonstrations, café 
para todos, or “coffee for everyone,” emphasized that regional autonomy should be available for 
all those who seek it. Indeed, the heightened devolution and label of “historic nationalities” are 
often considered unfair to those regions that do not share special status, further complicating 
center-periphery tensions. Some parties actively campaign to harmonize the system: slow-track 
Autonomous Communities continue to push for powers equal to the original historic 
nationalities (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 148; Pallarés and Keating 2006, 102; van Biezen and 
Hopkin 2006, 22).  
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In the end, Congress approved the formation of the Autonomous Community of 
Andalusia in 1981. While Andalusia is generally grouped with the fast-track regions because of 
its early ascent to autonomy, its procedure was not as easy or fast. Andalusia’s autonomous 
initiative depended on the approval of three-quarters of the municipal councils, an overall 
majority of voters in each province, and a second referendum approving the actual language of 
its autonomous statute. So while it ascended to autonomous status more quickly than most 
regions, its lack of a pre-civil war referendum meant it had to clear additional hurdles. Regardless, 
once its Statute of Autonomy was approved under Article 151 of the Constitution, it has enjoyed 
the same “fast-track” status of the three special provision regions. 
Andalusia’s particular route to autonomy was initially open to all regions; however, the 
failed military coup of 1981 prompted Congress to effectively stop any other region from 
following suit (Agranoff 1996, 390; Newton and Donaghy 1997, 121-124). Specifically, deputies 
approved the Law of Harmonization of the Autonomous Process, Ley Orgánica de Armonización 
del Proceso Autonómico (LOAPA). The law attempted to equalize the autonomy-seeking procedure. 
While significant sections of the law were overturned by the Constitutional Tribunal, it 
successfully set uniform standards for regional parliaments, executives, and financing. It is this 
law that requires all ACs formed after 1981 to hold their regional elections on the same date and 
accede to autonomy via Article 143 of the Constitution. LOAPA did not deter the remaining 
territories of Spain to form Comunidades Autónomas. These thirteen “slow-track” or “Article 143” 
regions became Autonomous Communities by May 8, 1983, effectively leaving no territory 
without autonomous status (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 123).  
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Legal Asymmetry: Traspasos de Competencias 
Between the passage of the Constitution and 1986, all of the newly created ACs assumed 
many powers transferred from the central government. In addition to the set of traspasos de 
competencias or transfers of powers constitutionally guaranteed to the ACs at their foundation, 
certain additional services were turned over from the center to the regions. These first few years 
of transfers were both rapid and relatively uncontested. Between 1978 and 1986, a grand total of 
nearly 1,000 transfers were approved by Congress, which make up over half the total they 
enjoyed in 2008, two decades later (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Running total of ceded powers by general election year 
 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Andalusia 2 20 85 87 98 109 115 127 151 
Aragon 3 16 55 56 63 85 96 98 104 
Asturias 1 16 55 59 59 79 94 95 104 
Baleares 2 15 51 52 60 84 96 101 109 
Canaries 1 8 67 69 78 103 112 116 119 
Cantabria 0 16 53 53 53 78 87 89 103 
Catalonia 7 53 82 93 103 121 145 162 180 
C-L 0 16 55 62 65 88 100 107 108 
C-M 1 15 55 60 62 81 86 90 92 
Extremadura 1 14 51 55 56 78 86 92 94 
Galicia 2 24 75 89 92 119 138 142 154 
La Rioja 0 0 34 38 38 57 70 73 75 
Madrid 0 0 39 45 46 70 82 93 93 
Murcia 0 14 55 59 62 88 97 105 111 
Navarra 0 0 32 36 40 40 59 60 60 
P. Vasco 3 43 66 73 73 88 91 91 93 
Valencia 3 21 80 91 93 107 125 127 130 
Total 26 291 990 1077 1141 1475 1679 1768 1880 
Source: Ministry of Public Administration. Author's calculations. 
 
After 1986, however, the rate of transfers slowed precipitously, in part due to the 
additional restrictions imposed by Spain’s entry into the European Union (at the time, the 
European Economic Community) and, more markedly, burgeoning multi-level conflicts. The 
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recognition of the central government as the sole representative body in the EU frustrated 
regional parties, and created new issues regarding AC jurisdiction and representation in an 
international context.  
As ACs gain more powers, more disagreements led to challenges in the Constitutional 
Tribunal. They disputed jurisdiction of each other’s laws and transfers regarding shared powers. 
Of course, constitutional challenges occur only in the event of the breakdown of bilateral 
negotiations between the center and AC (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 140-141).   
 Notably, the number of transfers varies both by year and by region (Table 1). No federal 
institution synchronizes or monitors the evolution of these transfers or relationships in general. 
Outside of bilateral negotiations and a judicial referee, no institutional recourse is available to 
settle central-regional conflict. Transfers of competencias likewise lack a uniform dispersal. Therein 
reside the roots and development of asymmetry within the Spanish state; each AC has 
“individual features which reflect their own special relationship with Madrid” (Newton and 
Donaghy 1997, 124).  
Weak Inter-level Institutions 
 Most of Spain’s modern political institutions are designed to accommodate its regions; 
however, it still lacks a regional institution at the level of the central government. While it has a 
Senate (Senado) described as a territorial chamber in the Constitution, it does not effectively 
represent regions and its powers are weak. Its formation as an upper house of parliament is 
instead a result of several proposals to smooth the transition from the authoritarian regime 
during the early democracy. Its powers fall far short of those of the Congress, and Article 90.2 
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ensures that Congress can virtually override any action from the upper house (Colomer 1998, 
49).  
 In regards to lawmaking, both houses can draft or propose legislation, but a bill enters 
the Senate for its “considered opinion” only when it has been passed by Congress. The Senate 
has two months to attempt to amend or veto the bill. Any amendments introduced by the Senate 
can then be accepted by a simple majority in the lower house. Alternatively, an absolute majority 
of senators may veto the bill, but several constraints prevent any veto from being long-standing.  
A senatorial veto can be reversed with an absolute majority of deputies; if the bill is more 
than two months old, a simple majority can suffice. Moreover, if a bill is deemed “urgent” by 
Congress or government, the Senate only has twenty days to review the text (Art. 90). In short, 
the Senado does not provide a “coordinated and institutionalized means for making all those 
decisions affecting both realms of power in such a way that both nationwide and regionally 
bounded interests are represented and protected” (Beramendi and Máiz 2004, 136).  
 Institutions that do organize inter-level negotiations are primarily administrative in 
nature. Regional and central government relations are coordinated by sector conferences and 
cooperation agreements that are limited in scope. Established in the early years of democracy 
and for specific policy areas, their powers are limited to ironing out administrative differences 
between levels. Of these inter-level arrangements, the Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy 
(CPFF) and the ministers of education are notable for their consistent meetings (Beramendi and 
Máiz 2004, 136-137). The policy proposals of such councils can be adopted into law via 
parliament. While they have successfully provided cooperative guidance to public projects in 
their respective fields, they do not provide regions with substantive policy-making or veto power. 
Neither sector conferences nor cooperative agreements can renegotiate autonomous authority, 
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and their own rules limit regional influence by granting central government equal votes in 
proposal approval (Montero 2005, 74).  
 Without formal institutions to foster central-regional shared rule, practically all policy 
and reform is a result of bilateral agreements (Agranoff 1996, 390; Colomer 1998, 49; Montero 
2005, 74). Many political elites suggest this is a problem, and that the solution is reform of the 
Senado and transitioning to a full federal system. While some experts agree that the parliament 
should become truly bicameral, others propose that the Senate should simply initiate review of 
regional concerns, draft policy proposals, or both (Agranoff 1996, 398). This debate, however, 
has been latent since the mid-1990s. To date, the Constitutional Tribunal remains the final 
authority on disagreements between the central and regional governments (Beramendi and Máiz 
2004, 137). Of course, universal regional reform can and does pass. It just has to be ratified on a 
bilateral basis by each region, such as in the case of regional financing.  
Fiscal Asymmetry: Regional Financing  
 Regional financing embodies the devolved and asymmetric character of Spain. It is a 
devolving process because financial powers are centralized and the dispersal is asymmetric 
because they are unequal. Montero divides regions into four fiscal groups. Two groups are from 
the slow-track Article 143 regions, divided by ACs made up of one or many provinces. The third 
fiscal group includes the fast-track regions Andalusia, Catalonia, and Galicia plus the Canary 
Islands and Valencia. The first three groups make up the “common” financial regime. Finally, 
Basque Country and Navarra have a “special” regime status, constitutionally protected by their 
historic fueros or charters. They are the most distinct from a financial lens in that they manage 
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their own taxes and return an annual cupo or quota of revenue to the central government (2005, 
76-77).  
 Regional spending practices reflect divisions between groups. Basque Country and 
Navarra spend the most per inhabitant, with the other fast-track group spending about two-
thirds of that amount. Uni- and multi-provincial Article 143 regions spend the least, at one-third 
and half the rate of fast-track regions, respectively (Montero 2005, 76).  For the common regime 
regions (all ACs less Basque Country and Navarra), the Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las 
Comunidades Autónomas, or LOFCA, established the negotiations of regional fiscal responsibility 
at five-year intervals: 1980-1986, 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, and 2002-2007. The most 
recent reform was approved in July 2009. The centerpiece of these negotiations is the transfer of 
money to regions from the center, calculated on the regions’ ability to collect taxes (for the 
central government). This increases asymmetry from a fiscal perspective, since tax revenues vary 
widely from one region to the next (Montero 2005, 75-76; Gimeno Ullastres 2008, 83).  
 LOFCA created the Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy (CPFF) whose members 
include the minister of finance, his or her regional counterparts, and the minister of public 
administration. Any reforms proposed by CPFF must be ratified by bilateral committees, 
Comisiones Mixtas de Transferencias. Again, this requires that each region agree to the reform with 
the central government individually. Chief among their policy-making powers is the reform of 
LOFCA at the end of each five-year interval. 
 The Spanish tax system has been highly centralized and requires all tax powers to be 
ceded by the central government to regions (Agranoff 1996, 391-394). Indeed, there has been a 
steady and substantial increase in ceded taxes and a corresponding decrease in central 
government transfers to ACs. And whenever powers are delegated to the ACs, their newly 
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acquired responsibilities must have approval through organic law and designate how they will be 
funded (Art. 150.2). Over time, total regional spending has increased to one third of public 
spending, or 42% of public spending outside of social security (OECD 2007, 96).  
 Central provision of social services, however, ensures that the levels of government 
remain intertwined even in areas that are strictly under AC jurisdiction. For example, while 
tourism initially fell exclusively under regional control, the Constitutional Tribunal later ruled it 
was a shared responsibility under economic development. The EU requires central regulation by 
setting standards in agriculture, fishing, and labor (Agranoff 1996, 396). The EU Commission 
has overruled AC control over modifying certain tax rates and applications (Gimeno Ullastres 
2008, 77). VAT and sales tax in particular encounter “the specific problem of the rigid rules 
surrounding tax harmonization that, as is known, have made more progress in this field than in 
any other” in the EU (Gimeno Ullastres 2008, 86). Regional sources of revenue are thus limited 
by both central and EU controls. On the other hand, certain EU funds can be routed directly to 
the ACs (and bypass central agencies) since 1994 (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 129). 
 In 2001, the central and regional governments accepted a “strong revision” of LOFCA 
which dramatically changed AC financing (Bosch and Durán 2008, 8). Most notably, 33% of 
personal income tax, 35% of value-added and excise taxes, and 100% of electricity taxes were 
devolved to the regions. The variety of new tax sources, however, are still generated through 
central tax revenues, and “no difference whatsoever exists between receiving a part of the state’s 
whole tax revenues and receiving many small portions” (Gimeno Ullastres 2008, 83). Roughly 
one-third of regional income still comes directly from central funds (Ruiz-Huerta and Herrero 
Alcalde 2008, 147).  
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 The 2001 LOFCA reform also demonstrates regional-central overlap in administration 
of the welfare state. Decentralization of health, education, and other social services must rely on 
central funding via the Sufficiency Fund, Fondo de Suficiencia.3 The CPFF wanted to ensure that all 
regions could provide a similar level of services for the “same level of fiscal effort”; this 
guarantee requires redistribution from fiscally robust regions to those with weaker fiscal capacity 
(Ruíz-Huerta and Herrero Alcalde 2008, 150). The amount of funds is determined by each 
region’s need, less its regional tax collection. If a region’s tax collection exceeded its expenditure 
needs (as it often does in Basque Country and the Balearic Islands), funds are transferred from 
the region (Ruíz-Huerta and Herrero Alcalde 2008, 153; OECD 2007). 
 Tax revenue and expenditure needs, however, are not based on the actual dollar amount 
collected or spent. Instead, the calculation of a region’s need is based on per capita income, 
population size, and (rural or insular) location. Likewise, tax revenue is based on a formula 
which takes the rate of ceded taxes at the year they were devolved to the region and adds the 
growth rates of central government taxes up to the current year (Ruíz-Huerta and Herrero 
Alcalde 2008, 152-153). In addition, it has a status quo or stop-gap mechanism which guarantees 
that regions with incoming revenue from the fund get at least the amount received the period 
prior. While equalization grants reduce the differences in services provided, their application 
varies widely across regions, and the formula to determine funds is convoluted. Equalization 
grants exacerbate fiscal asymmetry while maintaining central control. This is not necessarily 
viewed negatively by regional governments: central tax administration provides a political 
incentive for the ACs, which can blame the center for tax increases (Gimeno Ullastres 2008, 77).  
                                                 
 
3As outlined in Article 158 of the Constitution, Asignaciones de Nivelación, Equalization Grants, are to be transferred 
to a region when an increase in its population necessitates outside funding to maintain a minimum level of services. 
In practice, however, this specific fund has never been distributed (Ruiz-Huerta and Herrero Alcalde 2008, 150). 
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 Despite whether or not the arrangement is preferred, many of the funds raised by ACs 
are processed through the central administration (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 127). Such funds 
cannot be considered own-source revenue and must be considered separately (Rodden 2004, 
483). Spain’s regions are increasingly retaining a larger percentage of revenue; their public 
expenditure rivals those of federal countries (Bosch and Durán 2008, 5). Common regime 
“regions enjoy only a limited capacity for the self-generation of funds and the greater part of 
funds spent at regional levels derive from central coffers” (Newton and Donaghy 1997, 142). 
The impact of greater budgets is the ability to take responsibility for ceded competencias. Both 
power transfers and financing must be delegated from the center to the sub-units. Basque 
Country and Navarre, from a perspective of fiscal decentralization, are the only two ACs with a 
wholly autonomous fiscal system. In response, common regime regions petition for more 
comparable fiscal authority through LOFCA (OECD 2007, 95). 
Regional Finance Reform: The Catalonian Charge 
 Regions, however, are not passive recipients of funds or any other type of transfer. It is 
often at the urging of regional elites that powers are devolved to them. Historic regions usually 
provide the impetus for change in autonomous authority: territorial reform is a centrifugal force. 
Catalonia’s demand to control a greater portion of the income tax eventually led to reform 
across all regions in the early 1990s. Catalonia continued to champion devolution of the income 
tax, along with property tax, inheritance, and gaming taxes. By 2002, through separate 




 And reform does not always begin at the level of the autonomous government. Barreiro 
and Urquizo-Sancho suggest that territorial reform stems equally from Madrid as it does from 
the ACs themselves (2007, 543). Catalonia’s 2005 reform to its Statute of Autonomy became a 
countrywide issue in the 2007 local and regional elections. The reform colored debate in other 
regions because ratification of the reform by Congreso proved contentious. It was most 
controversial in regions controlled by the opposition (the PP) who portrayed acceptance of the 
reform as privileging Catalonia over others. This campaign gained traction in Madrid, where 
centralization is esteemed, and in Valencia, where the high level of Catalonian devolution is 
deemed unfair. Barreiro and Urquizo-Sancho argue that this success is manifest in the 2007 
election results: only in those two regions did the PP gain votes from the local to the regional 
elections. In the other regions, vote share remained consistent (2007, 544).  
 The PP’s countrywide effort to feed inter-regional resentment also represents the center-
periphery issue from an ideological standpoint. While sometimes a dormant issue, parties are 
often willing to bring it to the forefront during an election. Partisan and territorial interests 
coincide, and not only in the so-called “historic nationalities.” A proposal for greater autonomy 
in one region ignites the same desire in others (Bosch and Durán 2008, 21). This affects region-
to-region, center-to-region, and party-to-party relationships. 
 In Congress, both the PSOE and PP have allied with regional parties to form alliances in 
Congress. Regional parties have strong incentives to represent themselves at the level of the 
purse. And as an ally of the ruling party, their bargaining position is strong. Not surprisingly, 
Catalonian regional parties have often enjoyed this position, and they spearhead reform 
favorable to gains in regional responsibilities. LOFCA and the Catalonian trailblazer serve as the 
only harmonizing forces of fiscal equalization in the absence of a formal institution.  
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The “Orders” of Autonomy 
 In sum, the null powers of the Senate and the system of regional finance exacerbate the 
asymmetry of regional autonomy. The Constitution did not create an institution to coordinate 
central-regional concerns, and LOFCA reform remains dependent on bilateral approval. But 
there exists some cohesion in the latter process, since the reforms of one region (usually 
Catalonia) soon translates to similar adoptions in all others.  “Autonomy” itself is a sticky 
concept which, along with devolution, can be broken down and measured along distinct lines. In 
Spain, broad divisions are clear in regional legal and fiscal capacities. Two groups emerged at the 
establishments of ACs: fast- and slow-track regions. Likewise, regional fiscal arrangements fall 
under one of two categories, the special regime with historical fueros or the common (“non-
special”) regime. Fast-track ACs are not the same as the special regimes. That is, only País Vasco 
has membership in both groups.  
 The division between fast- and slow-track, or between “historic” and “non-historic,” 
remains the most marked: three of the four fast-track ACs also have the greatest number of 
devolved responsibilities (Table 1). The fourth, Basque Country, maintains a special regime 
financing system and police force. The fast-track regional institutions have greater normative 
and procedural autonomy. In contrast, the remaining regions began at a lower devolved status 
and remain “behind” despite several gains in transfers, as reflected in their levels of expenditure 
and transferred powers. 
 For this project, and consistent with prevailing literature on Spanish politics, the fast-
track ACs (Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia, and Andalusia) are assessed separately from the 
slow-track regions. Due to their distinct electoral timeline and large number of devolved 
responsibilities, fast-track regional politics are expected to take on a dynamic more independent 
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of the first-order arena. In particular, I expect that the outcomes of the fast-track regional 
elections will stray more frequently from expected vote share in the Dinkel test, since their 
regional assemblies can independently time their elections.   
Since dissimilarity scores are provided for each region, a more nuanced division between 
regions may take place. The financial authority of a region can be taken into account. While fast-
track regions are still expected to lead the rest in measures of volatility, Navarra’s special regime 
status is also expected to encourage region-specific voting behavior. All fast-track financial 
regions are expected to have greater dissimilarity scores than those of Article 143 regions. From 
a legal perspective, the number of ceded powers, financial or otherwise, a region possesses 
should correlate negatively with second-order effects.  
 
Methodology 
Methods of analysis center on the tests put forth by Jeffery and Hough to assess fit of 
the second-order framework to elections on different levels and in different regions. First, 
turnout is assessed as it flows with second-order logic in the same manner of straightforward 
comparison used by Reif and Schmitt in 1980. Second, Dinkel’s expected partisan vote share of 
regional and EP elections is plotted along a general election timeline. Third, the index of 
dissimilarity for these regions is tabulated for all countrywide election years. Together, these test 
results address two questions of each election type in question: first, do election results respond 
to the electoral cycle of the first-order political arena? And, second, does vote distribution reflect 
the election results of the first-order? An answer to the affirmative of either question implies 
that the election displays a “secondary” status.  
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Results from the European and regional levels are then compared to each other. And 
regions are compared to each other according to their level of departure from the central 
government’s control. The focal points across all levels remain performance of government, 
opposition, and small parties. This research project differs from Jeffery and Hough’s in three 
fundamental ways: instead of focusing on four regions, it examines all seventeen; instead of 
comparing just regional and countrywide elections, tests are calculated for elections to the EP; 
alongside territorial cleavages, degrees of decentralization are introduced as explanatory variables 
for second-order effects. Specifically, I expect fast-track and special regime regions to have a 
poorer fit to the SOE model. 
Although confined to one country, the study uses the comparative method, as defined by 
Lijphart (1971). Furthermore, this study’s focus on electoral regions within Spain aims to 
minimize the “many variables, small N problem of the comparative method” (1971, 686-687). 
That is, studying variance across regions within a single country enhances comparability “by 
focusing on intranation instead of internation comparison [which] can take advantage of the 
many similar national characteristics serving as controls” (1971, 689). The primary advantage to 
this approach is that several variables are controlled for, as the study takes place in one setting 
(with the major caveat that a country does, clearly, change over time in many respects). The main 
disadvantage is that a single national setting is limited in making generalizations across countries.  
With this is mind, the thesis narrows its focus to three levels of elections in Spain, using 
Jeffery and Hough’s 2003 article as a technical blueprint. According to Jeffery and Hough, the 
Spanish case was incompatible with the second-order model because of its heterogeneity: 
territorial cleavages and strong regional traditions bolstered regional elections closer to “first-
order” status in the minds of voters (2003). Hence voters do not believe there is less at stake in 
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regional elections, which violates the major premise of the second-order framework as outlined 
by Reif and Schmitt. If election results “fail” to conform to a second-order Dinkel curve, we 
expect high scores of dissimilarity from them as well. That is, a non-response to the electoral 
cycles of the general election should parallel evidence of “territorialization.” 
Findings in previous studies so far indicate that second-order effects do not extend to all 
of Spain’s regions, but they do in most (Hough and Jeffery 2003; Pallarés and Keating 2006). We 
expect second-order phenomenon to vary from location to location, and from time to time—it 
is interesting that they would vary so widely among regions belonging to the same state and 
during the same electoral moment. Reif and Schmitt first analyzed one second-order election 
(the 1979 EP election) to the first-order elections in many countries (1980). This study looks at 
two types of second-order elections (to the EP and regional assemblies) in one country across 
multiple cycles. 
Variables and Data Collection 
Sources 
 The Ministerio del Interior provides elections results for the central Spanish and EU 
parliaments. The Ministry leaves it to the Autonomous Communities to track vote distribution 
in elections to their respective parliaments. Fortunately, the Valencian AC government 
aggregates official voting data from all of its counterparts and is the single source for regional 
election results in this study. Both sources include absenteeism rates and vote share by party for 
individual elections. These sources provided all of the raw data for this project; however, all 
calculations and illustrations for turnout, Dinkel, and index of dissimilarity analyses are my own.  
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 The dependent variable, non-countrywide election results, will refer to elections to the 
regional and European parliaments. Also like Jeffery and Hough, “regions” are synonymous with 
Spain’s seventeen Autonomous Communities, to the exclusion of provinces and municipalities. 
Also excluded are Spain’s autonomous cities Ceuta and Melilla on the African coast, due to their 
unusual electoral arrangement.  
The first test is the national electoral cycle. Although Spain failed to conform to Dinkel’s 
curve in Hough and Jeffery’s analysis, it nevertheless creates a portrait of any voting patterns 
that emerge between countrywide elections. Consistent with earlier studies, the ratio of the 
actual vote share to the expected vote share is graphed according to the number of days since 
the previous general election (in Spain, an average of 1,325 days fall between elections).The 
second test and independent variable, territorial cleavages, is measured by the index of 
dissimilarity. The index attempts to operationalize the voters’ change of heart between elections. 
The formula is borrowed from segregation studies in sociology and adapted to voting behavior. 
For all k parties within a given region, it takes the absolute value of the difference in vote shares 
between levels, sums them, and divides the total by two: 
½ ∑│Pik-Pjk│ 
Wherein Pik is the vote percentage of k won in the countrywide election, and Pjk represents its 
vote share in the nearest regional election.  
Thus, the score represents the percentage of voters that would need to recast their votes 
in order for the regional and countrywide election results to become the same. Since in Spain 
both countrywide and regional levels use the same PR system, it also roughly determines how 
many votes would need to change in order to make the partisan balance of the AC and the 
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central parliaments mirror each other. Once graphed, the index provides an excellent resource to 
portray trends across both time and Autonomous Communities.  
It is important to note that completion of both steps of Jeffery and Hough’s analysis is 
necessary apart from results of the first step. Regardless of the results of the Dinkel analysis, 
explanatory powers of the second-order framework must be assessed while considering 
territorial cleavage. The index of dissimilarity may or may not correlate in the same manner as 
the Dinkel results. In order to find out whether a correlation between these effects exists in the 
first place, both tests’ results must be evaluated.   
Types of Parties 
 Vote share by regional population is the unit of analysis as well as the basis of calculation 
for both expected vote share and the index of dissimilarity. Within each region, parties are 
divided into five groups. The four countrywide parties each comprise one group: the PSOE, PP, 
UCD/CDS, and IU. As discussed above, only the first three have experience as governing or 
opposition parties at the central level. The UCD coalition governed only during the first five 
years of the new democracy, 1977-1982. In the 1982 election it competed separately from the 
CDS. After 1982, however, the CDS became the successor to the UCD; hence, for that year 
their vote share is combined. Like the UCD, the CDS has largely become increasingly 
unsuccessful, rarely gaining over one percent of the vote in the last three general elections. The 
marginal vote share it does garner, however, is considered separately from that of regional 
parties.  
 While the IU has never won a plurality of seats in Madrid, it also cannot be regarded as 
regional due to its countrywide, federal structure. Of the countrywide parties, it depends the 
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most on regional parties. Its ballot title in four ACs is presented in the regional dialect (in 
contrast to the PP, which never does, and the PSOE, whose name changes slightly only in 
Catalonia). In roughly six regions, the IU has formed pre-electoral pacts with regional parties, 
particularly after the new millennium and for European elections. In every one of these cases, 
however, the IU leads the ticket and votes for these coalitions are counted toward IU totals. 
 Hence the fifth type of party, regional or non-countrywide parties (NCWPs), is formed 
by default: once the countrywide parties are accounted for, the remaining parties are grouped 
under this final label. Failing to distinguish between regional parties who are more or less 
successful presents a potential limitation. Is it valid, for example, to group the nearly one million 
votes in Catalonia for the CiU in the 2000 general election with, say, the 85 votes of the 
unknown Partido Democrático del Pueblo? While this distinction is great, for the purposes of this 
study any vote for a party without a countrywide presence counts as a regional success. The 
second-order tests reviewed here do not focus on any specific regional party’s achievement but 
on the voters who do or do not rely on their first-order decision for second-order votes. 
Furthermore, for parties that dominate the regional vote share, they usually do so at a great 
extent. For example, together the CiU and ERC in Catalonia regularly make up over 70% of all 
votes cast for regional parties in AC elections. In neighboring Aragon, the regional parties PAR 
and CHA together make up over 90%.  
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that this grouping of regional parties does not capture 
vote change that occurs between regional parties (Marsh 1998, 595). For the index of 
dissimilarity, volatility is not captured if a voter chooses a regional party in a general election and 
a second regional party in a non-general election. Another caveat is that not all small parties are 
limited to one region. Many experience success in more than one AC, even parties that may 
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appear region-specific. For example, the party Extremadura Unida—which only averages around 
3% of the vote share in the region for which it is named—has supporting votes (albeit 
numbering in the hundreds) scattered in regions as far away as the Canary Islands. Regional 
parties may have inter-regional reach; they may not even cater to specific regional interests. Even 
if parties do not underscore regional issues on their platform, such as alternative communist 
parties to the IU, they are considered regional simply because they fail to achieve countrywide 
reach. In contrast, since the Dinkel test only considers main, opposition, and regional party types, 
the vote share for the CDS and IU are not illustrated at all. Their position with a weak, but 
countrywide, presence excludes them from Dinkel calculations altogether. 
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Tests and Analyses 
Turnout 
 A key manifestation of voters caring less about second-order contests is their failure to 
vote in the first place. Turnout data from Spain demonstrates that European elections suffer the 
most from voter apathy (Figure 1 and Table 2). For all of Spain, including general, regional, and 
European elections, average abstention is 32.27% (with a median of 31.66%). An additional 11% 
of voters stay home during EP elections, with an average abstention rate of 43.21%. Regional 
election abstention is roughly on par with the grand total average, at a rate of 31.95%. General 
elections garner the most voters, with 25.89% absenteeism. Overall, voters turn out most often 
for elections to Congreso, not as often for AC elections, and the least often for the European 
Parliament (Table 2). 
 
     Figure 1 Average abstention rates, 1979-2008 
 




Table 2 Average abstention rates, 1977-2007 (%) 
 General AC EP Total 
Andalusia 26.35 29.97 44.66 32.33 
P. Vasco 29.89 34.38 45.26 35.31 
Catalonia 27.33 40.73 49.51 37.03 
Galicia 36.08 38.63 50.24 40.64 
Aragon 24.45 32.08 43.26 31.66 
Asturias 28.70 36.13 44.72 35.10 
Baleares 30.02 37.94 51.41 38.01 
Canaries 32.81 36.48 50.50 38.63 
Cantabria 23.47 26.87 38.51 28.50 
C-L 23.74 29.24 39.45 29.52 
C-M 20.65 24.90 36.94 26.25 
Extremadura 22.76 25.05 37.49 27.40 
La Rioja 21.83 27.68 39.34 28.20 
Madrid 22.06 34.14 41.96 30.78 
Navarra 26.61 30.64 43.74 32.38 
Murcia 22.04 29.92 39.68 29.00 
Valencia 21.32 28.33 37.94 27.76 
Source: Ministry of Interior. Author’s calculations.  
 
 
 At the general level, fast-track regions have an abstention rate of 29.91%.4 Article 143 
regions, on the other hand, have an average general abstention of 24.65%. The 5% disparity 
between fast- and slow-track regions is maintained for elections to the autonomous (36% versus 
31%) and European parliaments (47% versus 42%). Catalonia, Galicia, and the insular regions 
have the four highest AC abstentions; the same four have the highest EP absenteeism (Table 2). 
 For all levels of elections, average abstention is greatest in regions with higher numbers 
of devolved responsibilities: the fast-track and special regime regions make up five of the top 
eight abstention rates. The other three are Asturias and the two insular regions. The Balearic and 
Canary Islands have the two highest EP abstention rates and the second and third highest 
                                                 
 
4 Galicia has an average of 36%, which is skewed by a 50% abstention rate during the 1979 general elections; 
however, even dismissing that outlier, the fast-track abstention average only drops to 29.50%.  
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general abstention rates, with Asturian absenteeism hovering around fifth place for all three 
levels of elections. The number of responsibilities ceded to the Canaries (119) is second only to 
the number of responsibilities assigned to Valencia (131) among the slow-track regions as of 
2008. The Balearics have the fourth highest (109). The reverse also holds true: Castilla la Mancha 
(C-M) and Extremadura have the two highest rates of participation in AC and EP elections and 
few transferred powers (92 and 94, respectively) (Figure 1 and Table 1).  
 On one hand, lower rates of abstention in highly devolved regions contradict my 
hypothesis that a second-order characteristic (low turnout) would be weaker in their elections. 
On the other hand, this is not surprising considering that fast-track ACs hold elections 
separately from the remaining thirteen regions, whose elections are held in tandem with local 
ones. Also, the type—not merely the quantity—of votes has not yet been taken into account.  
 Voters may be more active in slow-track regions, but across Spain, turnout behavior is 
consistent when comparing the levels to each other. By and large, turnout for all regions—
regardless of devolved status—rank in the same order, from largest to smallest: general, regional, 
and European (Table 2). Concerning participation averages, the only exception to this ranking is 
the inaugural 1986 election to the EP. And of the three individual exceptions, they are all 
instances in which regional trumped general turnout in fast-track ACs. Two instances occur in 
Basque Country and concern the high rate of abstention in the 2000 congressional election 
(36%) which surpassed those of the regional elections in 1998 and 2001 (32% and 21%, 
respectively). The third exception was in Andalusia, where the difference was minuscule (21.9% 
versus 22.7%), and when its regional election coincided with the general election of 1996. More 
voters turned in (barely) more ballots for this regional contest even though the opportunity cost 
to vote in the general election was minor. Previous second-order analyses are held up in this 
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case: outside of compulsory voting, Schmitt found that concurrent first-order electoral timing is 
the largest indicator of an increase in turnout for EP elections among its member states (2005, 
657). The exceptional cases in Basque Country and Andalusia partially support the expectation 
that the stakes surrounding a fast-track AC election may pull up turnout numbers; on the flip 
side, it may be more of a function of meager levels of general election participation.  
In contrast to regional levels, European turnout unequivocally falls behind the pack, 
averaging 16% lower than the general election average and 11% lower than AC elections. Even 
in the 1999 elections, which fell on the same day as local and slow-track AC elections, an average 
of 3.52% fewer ballots were cast for European Parliament candidates. In sum, looking solely at 
relative turnout rates, the division is clear between levels, and rather sizeable in the case of the 
EP. The turnout pattern is less distinct between regions, with fast-track ACs displaying steadily 
high averages for abstention but whose cases of exceptionally high turnout contribute to the 
notion that their stakes rival those of the first-order elections. 
Dinkel Analysis 
 The 2003 Jeffery and Hough article found the Dinkel curve in Spanish elections to 
directly contradict second-order assumptions: the governing party performed best midterm, 
while opposition and regional parties suffered. Notably, the data sample for said study was from 
four regions, two in the fast-track (Catalonia and Galicia) and two from the slow-track 
(Extremadura and Castilla la Mancha) groups. An updated analysis of expected vote share using 
this same sample reveals similar results. An aggregate analysis of Spanish regions, as a whole, 
indicates that voting behavior more often than not fulfills second-order expectations.  
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 Similar to results in the 2003 study, the pattern set by the Dinkel curve is “mild but 
distinctive” (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 202). As demonstrated by the figures’ scatter plots, 
standard error is large but clear trends emerge (Figures 2-3). Trend lines in all figures are based 
on quadratic equations, since partisan support is expected to be parabolic, peaking or bottoming-
out at the midpoint between general elections (Schmitt 2005, 659). The resulting curves in both 
AC and EP elections reflect unfavorable midterm cyclical effects. Most parties perform poorly 
relative to their respective vote shares near countrywide contests, with the exception of regional 
parties in European elections. In comparing parties’ expected vote share to each other, the most 
definitive recurring pattern is created by regional parties, which surpass their expected vote share 
much more frequently, and to a greater degree, than the two main parties. Finally, of the two 
levels analyzed, fewer exceptions to second-order expectations occur on the European level.  
Regional Elections 
 Figures 2 and 3 include AC election data from all seventeen regions. The trends reveal 
that governing, opposition, and small parties are more successful as elections are held closer to 
general election dates. Contrary to the four-region sample in Jeffery and Hough’s study, the 
governing party in Madrid suffers most midterm; however, this fits the second-order assumption 
that voters employ punishment effects against the main governing party at this point. Like the 
results of Jeffery and Hough, opposition and regional parties challenge second-order predictions 









Figure 3 Regional party performance in regional elections, 1980-2007 


























































scale for small parties, however, is much larger than that for the main or opposition parties. 
Most NCWPs achieve much higher levels of expected vote share than their larger counterparts: 
at face value, countrywide election results undersell the potential performance of NCWPs at 
regional moments. 
In light of the second-order framework, expected vote share for the governing party fits 
cyclical predictions: it averages only 89.77% and only a quarter of cases met or exceeded 
expected vote.  Both opposition and regional parties’ patterns are contrary to second-order 
estimations. While punishment effects are supposed to favor opposition parties midterm, their 
expected vote share dips below that of the governing party precisely at that point (Figure 2). 
Throughout the cycle, however, the opposition fares slightly better than the governing party, 
meeting 93.02% of its expected vote on average.  
 Regional parties almost double their expected vote share, at an average rate of 189.69% 
(Figure 3). Fewer than 12% of regional cases fail to surpass expectations set by the general 
elections. The trend arc is more flattened-out, however, and their relative performance does not 
crest midterm. Interestingly, they fare slightly better leading up to, rather than following, a 
general election. Since all three types of parties experience midterm punishment effects, the 
advantage goes to the regional parties. They exceed expected vote share most often and to an 
intense degree. 
 Cyclical effects take on the same pattern regardless of the devolved status of regions 
(Figures 4-7). The arcs for expected party support are similar for Article 143 regions and the 
four fast-track regions, which mirror the patterns of all regions together. Only the government’s 
performance matches second-order expectations. Despite having separate regional voting dates, 









Figure 5 Regional party performance in fast-track regional elections, 1980-2006   
 































































Figure 7 Regional party performance in slow-track regional elections, 1980-2007 
 


























































 Likewise, the reproduction of Hough and Jeffery’s sample including Extremadura, 
Castilla la Mancha, Catalonia and Galicia have trend lines for two party types opposite of what 
electoral cycles literature would suggest (the exception being regional trends)(Figure 8). That is, 
voters treat opposition parties more favorably near the moment of a general election, and the 
party in government actually performs relatively better the further an election takes place from a 
countrywide contest. Regional party support, however, remains strong, achieving 143.88% of 
expected vote share and peaking midterm.  
 Assessing the two slow-track regions separately reveals no substantial difference: for 
Castilla la Mancha and Extremadura, the Dinkel curve for regional parties conforms to second-
order predictions by peaking mid-cycle (Figure 9). While the regional party trend line in fast-
track regions also crests midterm, the arc for the Catalonia and Galicia is less pronounced. 
Overall, vote share averages are slightly more consistent and favorable in the fast-track regions 
(meeting 148.56% of expected vote share, as compared to 138.87% in Castilla la Mancha and 
Extremadura).  
Yet the “wrong” trends for main parties prevail even without the influence of the two 
fast-track regions. Castilla la Mancha and Extremadura—with relatively few transferred powers 
and memberships to the common financial regime—still depart from second-order electoral 
rhythms. Given that these two regions also have the two highest turnout rates for AC elections, 
second-order prospects appear bleak all around. The two fast-track ACs (Catalonia and Galicia) 
each have a stronger regional party presence and higher devolution measures: it follows that  
votes cast in their favor are not necessarily in response to cyclical effects (Figure 10). But the 
second-order deviations of the slow-track sample also imply that more than first-order 




Figure 8 Party performance in regional elections in Extremadura, Castilla la Mancha,  





Figure 9 Party performance in regional elections in Extremadura and  

































































Figure 10 Party performance in Catalonia and Galicia in regional elections, 1980-2006 
 
Sources: As for Figure 1. 
 
 
European Parliament Elections  
 Curves for European elections flow in the same direction across the electoral cycle 
regardless of level of regional autonomy. Fast- and slow-track ACs experience an increase in 
small party support near midterm and overtake expected vote share by an average of 35% and 
54%, respectively. In contrast, voters distance themselves from the two large parties most 
frequently midterm (Figure 11). The party in central government suffers the most, but also 
makes more relative gains as the next general election approaches. Roughly a year before an 
upcoming election, expected vote rates for the government party surpass those of the opposition, 
who, up to that point, fared better than its competition in Madrid. 
 Actual votes for regional parties swell in comparison to expected votes at midterm. The 

































regional gains coincide with main party losses (Figure 12). This fits Reif and Schmitt’s second-
order prediction that voters, since it is less risky to do so, experiment with smaller parties while 










Figure 12 Regional party performance in EP elections, 1987-2004 
 


























































A Comparison of Levels 
 The common denominator in the SOE scatter plots is the position regional parties enjoy. 
Consistently, small parties perform much better in the SOEs than in the general election. Over 
the term of the general-to-general election cycle, NCWPs average 149.18% of expected vote 
share. The opposition and governing parties pick up much lower averages, 97.44% and 92.95%, 
respectively. In all, findings from the Dinkel tests are modest, but clearly differentiate between 
European and AC cyclical effects. For regional elections, no trend line explains a significant 
amount of variance for any type of party (p<.05). The trend line for European cases explains 
about one-third of the variance for governing (r2=.32), opposition (r2=.29) and regional parties 
(r2=.33; p<.05). While this is a fairly small amount of explained variance, it certainly improves 
upon that of regional vote share and predicts a fair amount using a single independent variable. 
 Graphing relative vote share provides a useful initial illustration of cyclical effects, or, 
rather, the lack of one. These results fall in line with the 2003 Jeffery and Hough study, and in 
large part imply that a “countervailing dynamic” takes place outside of regional-to-general 
subordination in Spain (2003, 204). Something outside of the general election cycle is affecting 
vote share in AC elections.  
 In contrast, vote shares in elections to the European Parliament exhibit a link to the 
rhythm of the countrywide arena. “Punishment effects” are more prevalent, and the two large 
parties lose midterm. This occurs in all types of regions; devolved status has little effect on the 
size or shape of these effects. Unlike regional elections, all regions must vote for the EP 
simultaneously and as an entire constituency, which dampen the impact of a NCWP vote. 
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Nevertheless, they fare very well. This follows second-order reasoning: voters are more likely to 
stray from the main parties when stakes are lower. 
 A comparison of the two levels is clear: the European level responds much more so to 
the timing of general elections. This supports the Heath, et al. conclusion that European 
elections appear to have a greater degree of “second-orderness” than regional elections (1997). 
Regional elections are more unpredictable and do not conform to a set pattern—second-order 
or otherwise. Unfortunately, the lack of any regional election trend does little to support my 
expectation that a clear differentiation would occur between fast- and slow-track regions. So 
while a measurable disparity exists between election levels, no clear distinction arises from a 
comparison between territories. 
Index of Dissimilarity 
Table 3 Index of dissimilarity averages, 1980-2009 (%) 
A Comparison of Levels 
 Given the expected vote 
share results, dissimilarity scores for 
EP should be correspondingly low, 
while they should be sporadic for 
regional elections. Table 3 provides 
average indices of dissimilarity for 
all regions, with the four fast-track 
regions listed first. Like the Dinkel 
test results, European elections 
 AC EU Total 
Andalusia 7.49 7.82 7.65 
P. Vasco 12.72 8.32 10.52 
Catalonia 17.61 7.72 12.67 
Galicia 15.30 6.55 10.92 
Cantabria 23.79 8.67 16.23 
Canaries 18.28 9.36 13.82 
Navarra 12.98 10.95 11.97 
Baleares 14.69 8.37 11.53 
Aragon 13.77 7.80 10.78 
Valencia 8.33 9.76 9.05 
Asturias 7.33 6.51 6.92 
C-M 8.29 5.17 6.73 
Madrid 5.86 7.47 6.66 
C-L 6.49 5.69 6.09 
La Rioja 5.74 6.38 6.06 
Extremadura 6.29 5.26 5.78 
Murcia 5.66 5.65 5.66 
Source: As for Table 2. 
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most frequently fit second-order assumptions and exhibit the lowest volatility rates. The average 
indices for the Region de Murcia are nearly identical at the two levels, fixed at a low 5.65%. For 
most other regions, volatility is higher at the AC level. Navarra, the region with the highest rate 
of average EP volatility, 11%, still falls short of its regional index, 13%. As expected of a less-at-
stake election, European votes more closely mirror those of the nearest general election.  
 Comparing overall averages, the European index score (7.50%) is 3.72% less than that of 
the regional one (11.21%). This difference is equal to half and one-third of the EP and AC 
election averages, respectively. The two levels also have different ranges of index scores. The 
difference between the high and low scores in the EU column is 5.78; among regional scores, 
that number more than triples to 18.13%.  
European Parliament Elections 
 While EP volatility noticeably increased for the 1994 elections, it has more or less 
hovered around 7%, dropping to a low of 4.20% in 2004 (Table 4). The Dinkel factor plays a 
role here, in that the 2004 EP and Spanish general elections took place within ninety-one days of 
each other. The electoral cycles pattern in EP elections analyzed above imply that first-order 
decisions are more likely to be replicated the closer a SOE is to a congressional contest. In other 







Table 4 Index of dissimilarity for EP elections, 1986-2004 (%) 
 1986 1989 1993 2000 2004 Mean 
Andalusia 10.11 9.79 10.66 5.18 3.38 7.82 
P. Vasco 10.96 4.97 7.14 14.40 4.14 8.32 
Catalonia 7.16 6.62 12.79 6.60 5.45 7.72 
Galicia 5.84 9.02 11.92 4.32 1.68 6.55 
Cantabria 10.89 11.01 17.64 2.20 1.63 8.67 
Canaries 9.23 7.80 13.42 8.06 8.32 9.36 
Navarra 9.69 12.50 11.16 12.99 8.43 10.95 
Baleares 5.98 10.10 9.94 8.25 7.56 8.37 
Aragon 6.45 3.96 16.44 4.44 7.70 7.80 
Valencia 9.69 7.48 8.41 4.35 6.80 7.35 
Asturias 4.67 8.70 9.39 6.87 2.95 6.51 
C-M 4.13 6.25 8.27 5.20 2.01 5.17 
Madrid 2.92 14.57 11.76 4.24 3.86 7.47 
C-L 3.51 10.14 9.96 2.62 2.20 5.69 
La Rioja 5.91 11.24 11.01 2.27 1.48 6.38 
Extremadura 6.41 5.92 7.72 4.76 1.48 5.26 
Murcia 5.22 7.30 8.54 4.80 2.41 5.65 
Source: As for Table 2.      
 
European index scores among regions vary to a lesser degree, but certain regions 
consistently stand out as those with dual voters between levels. Andalusia, Basque Country (P. 
Vasco), and Navarra had volatility over ten percent for two or more election years. Andalusia is a 
fast-track AC, and the remaining two have unique financial fueros: they are expected to have high 
degrees of volatility from general elections. No doubt EU regulations and funding opportunities 
influence the special financial regimes. This may also be the case in the Canary Islands, where as 
a peripheral region it has access to a special EU fund (insularity is often a benefit in receiving 
central Spanish funds as well). Lower volatility is expressed by scores from the remaining fast-
track ACs, Catalonia and Galicia. Catalonia’s index represents the median score and Galicia’s 
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slightly below. Their moderate volatility underscores consistent support for regional parties 
across levels: in both regions, their general and EP election vote shares differ less than 4% over 
their electoral lifespan. In contrast, the high score in the Cantabrian case drops precipitously 
after the 1993 election, which coincides with the downfall of the Unión para el progreso de Cantabria 
(UPCA) party. The organization imploded after its popular founder (and two-time president of 
the regional parliament) was accused of political scandals between the 1993 and 1996 general 
elections (Pallarés and Keating 2006, 116).  
Regional Elections 
 The index score of Cantabria remains robust from a regional perspective, once again 
marking the emergence and disappearance of an entire political party. The UPCA managed to 
collect over 30% of vote share for the 1991 regional election, but less than 9% for the following 
congressional election. Likewise, the now-defunct CDS was strongly favored in Cantabria in the 
first few general elections but overlooked for regional contests. The increase of the 2008 index 
score reflects the 29% vote share of the Partido Regionalista de Cantabria in the 2007 AC election 
versus the general election, in which the PSOE and PP split 94% of the vote. This voting 
behavior reflects second-order logic in that large parties are favored in first-order elections. In 
addition, Cantabria’s small population—less than half a million valid votes are typically cast in a 
given general election—contribute to the easy rise in vote share of a select party.  
 Leaving aside the Cantabrian outlier, five regions have consistently scored over ten 
percent in the last four regional contests held within their borders: País Vasco, Catalonia, the 
Canary Islands, Navarra, and the Balearic Island (Table 5). Of these, the Canary Islands and 
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Catalonia lead in averages. Given the results of the EP index scores, the steady presence of the 
CiU and the ever-growing one of the Coalición Canaria, this ranking is unsurprising.  
 
Table 5 Index of dissimilarity for AC elections, 1980-2008 (%) 
 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 Mean 
Andalusia  12.97 12.92 6.45 13.29 3.88 2.75 4.14 3.52 7.49 
P. Vasco 9.84 11.28 21.47 9.13  12.14 12.68 10.07 15.15 12.72 
Catalonia 10.91 24.64  15.56 19.10 19.35 14.92 12.17 24.27 17.61 
Galicia  34.10 12.69 8.87 15.57 30.08 4.34 6.70 10.03 15.30 
Cantabria  14.54 21.10 37.79  31.96 15.82 19.98 25.39 23.79 
Canaries  14.52 24.71 20.53  18.67 17.04 15.71 16.78 18.28 
Navarra  12.61 10.65 7.06  17.99 16.81 13.07 12.70 12.98 
Baleares  21.63 9.11 13.49  13.24 12.24 18.95 14.17 14.69 
Aragon  15.99 18.92 14.68  19.04 8.98 8.62 10.19 13.77 
Valencia  7.18 10.88 4.53  3.50 16.65 8.98 6.63 8.33 
Asturias  4.94 8.65 6.59  4.57 15.48 6.68 4.46 7.33 
C-M  12.90 1.89 6.92  3.79 12.93 11.43 8.17 8.29 
Madrid  5.74 4.08 12.08  2.57 3.39 4.29 8.88 5.86 
C-L  12.11 5.61 6.20  5.99 4.68 5.97 4.87 6.49 
La Rioja  10.28 7.91 5.21  4.31 2.76 6.65 3.08 5.74 
Extremadura  11.57 8.98 3.96  5.12 7.46 3.98 3.02 6.29 
Murcia  6.03 9.82 8.41  6.20 4.91 1.23 3.05 5.66 
Source: As for Table 2.          
 
 As Jeffery and Hough discovered, the indices “reveal a territorially uneven pattern” 
(2003, 210). Nine regions have index scores nearly half the rates of the top six, with values 
comfortably below ten percent. Except for Andalusia, they are slow-track regions. The 
Andalusian scores coincide with their European counterparts in that both drop around the 1996 
general election, when the AC began holding its elections on the same day as the countrywide 
contests. This supports the hypothesis that voters avoid dual voting when the switch has to 
occur on the same ballot. Besides Andalusia, the lowest indices emanate from regions with slow-
track standing and the common financial regime.  
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Summary and Conclusion 
 The pattern of interdependence of multi-level elections is both disrupted and followed in 
Spain. The “ranking” of elections on different levels is illustrated in both expected vote share 
and the dissimilarity index results. These tests provide a standardized means to track whether or 
not SOE expectations are met. They demonstrate that Spanish elections to the EP follow 
predictable patterns from the general elections, but elections to regional assemblies are not so 
well-defined in relation to the first-order arena. The European-general versus regional-general 
relationship differ within the same constituency.  
 Again, both the Dinkel analysis and dissimilarity test have limitations and are openly 
crude in application. It is not within their abilities to predict election outcomes; instead, their 
roles “provide at least initial techniques for mapping out the dynamic of multi-level voting” 
(Jeffery and Hough 2003, 210). In Spain, this dynamic, on one level, does not undermine the 
second-order framework. In the case of European elections, voters defer decision-making to the 
environment of the first-order arena and to their own previous first-order choice (if even to 
purposefully deny it at midterm). Turnout is low, punishment effects are predictable along the 
electoral cycle and few voters choose different parties from the general level.  
In contrast, regional elections stray from the second-order course. Fewer voter choices 
during regional elections reflect timing of countrywide elections to parliament. Likewise, 
volatility between the general and regional levels varies widely among regions. When it comes to 
selecting a parliamentary member of a regional government, only voters in some regions refer to 
their central-level choice.  
Across levels, improved performance of regional parties relative to the general election is 
the most persistent pattern. While Spain is largely a two-party dominant system, its NCWPs have 
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a strong presence, and perform well in both European and regional elections. At these times, 
voters choose to make their regional priorities known. Certain NCWPs, especially those from 
historic regions and the Canary Islands, regularly achieve representation at the central level, 
which suggests that for some voters regional issues are always of the first order.  
  Comparing levels, the stakes appear to be much higher in regional versus European 
elections. Pertaining to second-order research, this thesis most parallels the work of Heath, et al.: 
countrywide elections hold first-order status, EP elections have second-order status, and regional 
elections fall somewhere between at one-and-three-quarters status (1999, 409). Alternatively, 
other researchers relegate EP elections to the “third order” (Norris 1997, 121). But where those 
authors focus on voter attitudes (issue-voting), my primary consideration is structural (intensity 
of devolution). Again, reviewing voting patterns across electoral cycles and levels reveals how 
they do or do not fit to the SOE, not why voters choose to support a party. These tests illustrate 
vote distribution with the assumption that voters care less about SOE outcomes. Together, the 
tests reaffirm Jeffery and Hough's 2003 finding that SOE cyclical deviations correlate with high 
scores of dissimilarity between regional and countrywide elections. Interestingly, and contrary to 
my own proposed hypothesis, low volatility ACs also stray from predictable SOE-model 
patterns during regional contests. 
So why do AC elections fail to mold to the SOE framework? My hypothesis that credits 
devolution rates is only modestly supported. Test results are irregular in demonstrating a link 
between levels of devolution and (the absence of) second-order characteristics. While it appears 
that “territorial heterogeneity breaks up [the] pattern of subordination of regional elections” 
(Jeffery and Hough 2003, 210), the source of said heterogeneity is not clearly a result of the State 
of the Autonomies. Fast-track regions do not stray from expected vote share in a regular fashion. 
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This affirms a departure from the voting calculus of first-order elections, but the extent of that 
departure is not equal in kind to the degree of a region’s autonomy from the center. Fast-track 
and special regime regions, for example, have an above-average but not the highest dissimilarity 
scores: the highest levels of devolution do not translate to the most extreme denial of second-
order effects, and vice versa.  
So while “dissimilarity indices vary considerably between regions with and without 
strongly defined senses of territorial identity” (Jeffery and Hough 2003, 210), they also vary 
between regions with and without many transferred powers. This does not contradict per se the 
original framework of Reif and Schmitt, since regional electoral stakes vary due to the type and 
amount of powers attained by the ACs. The underlying foundation of the second-order thesis is 
maintained: as stakes increase, second-order effects decrease (1980). For the most part, volatility 
increases in fast-track ACs while the inverse is true for slow-track regions. Notable exceptions 
do occur on both ends, however, as demonstrated by the high volatility rates in Cantabria and 
the low ones in Andalusia.  
This thesis’s discussion and analyses orbit around the devolved nature of Spain’s regions, 
and relatively neglect other social and structural indicators, primarily regional identity and party 
systems in Spain (Pallarés and Keating 2006; van Biezen and Hopkin 2006). There is no denial 
that each play a large role in Spanish politics, and it is difficult to separate them from 
(asymmetrical) devolution. Integration of party system analyses is particularly unavoidable in 
discussing outlier cases of expected vote and dissimilarity scores.  
Indeed, devolution, party systems, and regional identity reinforce each other. Regional 
identity is certainly encouraged under a devolved system: especially in regards to self-government, 
regionalism is advanced in areas of education, language, cultural affairs, and media 
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communication (Agranoff 1996, 395). The next step in this line of research is to filter out these 
effects and establish how they interact with each other. More precise indicators of devolution 
will no doubt help in developing a better measure of regional autonomy. The quantity of 
transferred powers, for instance, needs to be differentiated by type: not all transfers are equal. 
Another limitation to my devolution-based hypotheses, and subsequent analyses, is that they 
presuppose that voters are aware of the relative strength of each office, when in fact they are 
more likely not to be up-to-date on the growing functions of the EP (Norris 1997, 121; Schmitt 
2005, 668) or the number of transfers or fiscal responsibilities gained in their Autonomous 
Community (Bosch and Durán 2008, 15). Only polling or survey data can answer whether or not 
this is the case. 
 In closing, the second-order framework enumerates certain qualities of election results to 
compare them across multiple levels: second-order elections have lower turnout, higher rates of 
punishment or experimental voting, and midterm electoral effects. All characteristics are foils of 
the main arena: they are not measured independently but in relation to the first-order level. In 
Spain, the same constituency, in the same four-year term and given the same competing political 
parties, distributes vote share differently on each electoral level. Spaniards certainly do not pin 
their votes to one party. The prevailing challenge is to find the point at which the stakes of an 





Abedi, A. and A. Siaroff. 1999. The mirror has broken: Increasing divergence between National  
 and Land elections in Austria. German Politics 8(1): 207-227. 
–––. 2006. Austria: Divergence within limits. In Hough and Jeffery, eds. 157-174. 
Agranoff, R. 1996. Federal evolution in Spain. International Political Science Review 17(4): 385-401. 
Aja, E. 2001. Spain: Nation, nationalities, and regions. In Subnational democracy in the European  
 Union: Challenges and opportunities, J. Loughlin, ed. 229-252. 
Amoretti, U. and N. Bermeo, eds. 2004. Federalism and territorial cleavages. Baltimore: Johns 
 Hopkins. 
Barreiro, B. and I. Urquizu-Sancho. 2007. Under the impact of territorial reform: The May 2007 
 local and regional elections in Spain. South European Society and Politics 12(4): 535-545. 
Beramendi, P. and R. Máiz. 2004. In Amoretti and Bermeo, eds. 123-154. 
Bosch, N. and J. Durán, eds. 2008. Fiscal federalism and political decentralization: Lessons 
 from Spain, Germany and Canada. Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
Botella, J. 1989. The Spanish “new” regions: Territorial and political pluralism. International 
 Political Science Review 10(3): 263-271. 
Chhibber, P. and K. Kollman. 2004. The formation of national party systems: Federalism and party 
 competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States. Oxfordshire: Princeton. 
Colomer, J. 1998. The Spanish ‘state of autonomies’: Non-institutional federalism. West 
 European Politics 21(4): 40-52. 
del Castillo, P. 1996. Spain: A dress rehearsal for the national elections. In Choosing Europe? 
 The European electorate and national politics in the face of union, C. van der Eijk and M. 




Deschouwer, K. 2003. Political parties in multi-layered systems. European Urban and Regional 
 Studies 10(3): 213-226. 
Dinkel, R. 1977. Der zusammenhang zwischen Bundesund Landtagswahlergebnissen. Politische 
 Vierteljahresschrift 18(3): 348-360. 
Gilmour, J. 2006. Partido Popular. In Hanley and Loughlin, eds. 21-27. 
Gimeno Ullastres, J. 2008. Tax assignment and regional co-responsibility in Spain. In Bosch 
 and Durán, eds. 74-105. 
Gunther, R., S. Giacomo, and G. Shabad. 1986. Spain after Franco: The making of a competitive  
 party system. Berkely: University of California. 
Hamann, K. 1999. Federal institutions, voting behavior, and party systems in Spain. Publius  
29: 111-137. 
–––. 2007. What can students learn from the Spanish case in comparative politics courses?  
 PSOnline October 2007. www.apsanet.org (accessed July 7, 2009). 
Hanley, D. 2006. Spanish political parties outside Spain. In Hanley and Loughlin, eds. 158-163. 
Hanley, D. and J. Loughlin, eds. 2006. Spanish political parties. Cardiff: University of Wales. 
Hearl, D., I. Budge, and B. Pearson. 1996. Distinctiveness of regional voting: A comparative 
 analysis across the European Community (1979-1993). Electoral Studies 15(2): 176-182. 
Heath, A., I. McLean, B. Taylor, and J. Curtice. 1999. Between first and second order: A  
comparison of voting behavior in European and local elections in Britain. European 
Journal of Political Research 35: 389-414. 
Hix, S. 2004. Electoral institutions and legislative behavior: Explaining voting defection in the  




Hough, D. and C. Jeffery, eds. 2006. Devolution and electoral politics. New York: Manchester. 
Jeffery, C. and D. Hough. 2001. The electoral cycle and multi-level voting in Germany. German 
 Politics 10(2): 73-98. 
–––. 2003. Regional elections in multi-level systems. European Urban and Regional Studies 10(3):  
199-212. 
Johnston, R. 1980. Federal and provincial voting: Contemporary patterns and historical 
evolution. In Small worlds: Provinces and parties in Canadian political life, D. Elkins and R. 
Simeon, eds. Ontario: Methuen. 
Lancaster, T. 2003. The government of Spain. In Western European government and politics,  
M. Curtis, ed. New York: Longman. 327-395. 
Lancaster, T. and M. Lewis-Beck. 1986. The Spanish voter: Tradition, economics, ideology. The 
 Journal of Politics 48(3): 648-674. 
–––. 1989. Regional vote support: The Spanish case. International Studies Quarterly 33(1): 29-43. 
Lewis-Beck, M. 1995. Economics and elections: The major western democracies. Ann Arbor:  
University of Michigan. 
Lijphart, A. 1971. Comparative politics and the comparative method. American Political Science  
Review 65: 682-693. 
Marsh, M. 1998. Testing the second-order election model after four European elections. British 
Journal of Political Science 28: 591-607. 
Michavila, N. 2005. War, terrorism, and elections: Electoral impact of the Islamist terror  
attacks on Madrid. Working Paper 13, Real Instituto Elcano April 2005. 




Montero, A. 2005. The politics of decentralization in a centralized party system: The case of  
democratic Spain. Comparative Politics 38(1): 63-82.  
Newton, M. and P. Donaghy. 1997. Institutions of modern Spain: A political and economic guide.  
 New York: Cambridge. 
Norris, P. 1997. Second-order elections revisited. European Journal of Political Research 31:  
109-124. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2007. Economic surveys: Spain.  
Paris: OECD. 
Pallarés, F. and M. Keating. 2006. Multi-level electoral competition: Substate elections and 
 party systems in Spain. In Hough and Jeffery, eds. 97-118. 
Reif, K., ed. 1984. European elections 1979/81 and 1984: Conclusions and perspectives from empirical  
 research. Berlin: Quorum. 
–––. 1997. European elections as member state second-order elections revisited. European Journal  
 of Political Research 31: 115-124. 
Reif, K. and H. Schmitt. 1980. Nine second-order elections – A conceptual framework for the  
analysis of European election results. European Journal of Political Research 8: 3-44.  
Rodden, J. 2004. Comparative federalism and decentralization: On meaning and measurement. 
 Comparative Politics 36(4): 481-500. 
Ruiz-Huerta, J. and A. Herrero Alcalde. 2008. Fiscal equalization in Spain. In Bosch 
 and Durán, eds. 147-172. 
Rush, M. 2007. Voting power in federal systems: Spain as a case study. PSOnline October 2007. 
 www.apsanet.org (accessed June 30, 2009). 
76 
 
Schmitt, H. 2005. The European parliament elections of June 2004: Still second-order? West 
 European Politics 28(3): 650-679. 
Share, D. 2006. Politics in Spain. In European politics today. New York: Pearson. 247-299. 
Spanish Constitution. http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/constitucion/ 
 pages/ConstitucionIngles.aspx (accessed January 3, 2010). 
van Biezen, I. and J. Hopkin. 2006. Party organization in multi-level contexts. In Hough  
 and Jeffery, eds. 14-36. 
van der Eijk, C. and H. Schmitt, eds. 2008. The multilevel electoral system of the EU. Connex 
 Report Series, no.4, http://www.connex-network.org/series (accessed June 30, 2009).  
Wolinetz, S. and K. Carty. 2006. Disconnected competition in Canada. In Hough and  



















General 6/15/1977 1977 
 
General 3/3/1996 1996 
General 3/1/1979 1979 
 
Galicia 10/19/1997 1996 
P. Vasco 3/9/1980 1979 
 
P. Vasco 10/25/1998 2000 
Catalonia 3/20/1980 1979 
 
EP 6/13/1999 2000 
Galicia 10/20/1981 1982 
 
Slow-Track ACs 6/13/1999 2000 
Andalusia 5/23/1982 1982 
 
Catalonia 10/17/1999 2000 
General 10/28/1982 1982 
 
Andalusia 3/12/2000 2000 
Slow-Track ACs 5/8/1983 1982 
 
General 3/12/2000 2000 
P. Vasco 2/26/1984 1982 
 
P. Vasco 5/13/2001 2000 
Catalonia 4/29/1984 1982 
 
Galicia 10/21/2001 2000 
Galicia 11/24/1985 1986 
 
Slow-Track ACs 5/25/2003 2004 
Andalusia 6/22/1986 1986 
 
Catalonia 11/16/2003 2004 
General 6/22/1986 1986 
 
Andalusia 3/14/2004 2004 
P. Vasco 11/30/1986 1986 
 
General 3/14/2004 2004 
EP 6/10/1987 1986 
 
EP 6/13/2004 2004 
Slow-Track ACs 6/10/1987 1986 
 
P. Vasco 4/17/2005 2004 
Catalonia 5/29/1988 1989 
 
Galicia 6/19/2005 2004 
EP 6/15/1989 1989 
 
Catalonia 11/1/2006 2008 
General 10/29/1989 1989 
 
Slow-Track ACs 5/27/2007 2008 
Galicia 12/17/1989 1989 
 
Andalusia 3/9/2008 2008 
Andalusia 6/23/1990 1989 
 
General 3/9/2008 2008 
P. Vasco 10/28/1990 1989 
 
Galicia 3/1/2009 2008 
Slow-Track ACs 5/26/1991 1989 
 
P. Vasco 3/1/2009 2008 
Catalonia 3/15/1992 1993 
 
EP 6/7/2009 2008 
General 6/6/1993 1993 
    Galicia 10/17/1993 1993 
    Andalusia 6/12/1994 1993 
    EP 6/12/1994 1993 
    P. Vasco 10/23/1994 1996 
    Slow-Track ACs 5/28/1995 1996 
    Catalonia 11/19/1995 1996 
    Andalusia 3/3/1996 1996 
    
78 
 
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
To
tal
A
nd
alu
ci
a
2
8
10
28
22
10
5
2
7
4
10
1
3
3
1
11
8
3
5
8
15
1
A
ra
go
n
3
4
9
14
17
5
3
1
3
4
7
14
1
2
6
3
1
1
1
3
2
1
5
11
0
A
st
ur
ias
1
3
12
17
12
8
2
1
3
5
15
11
4
1
6
1
2
10
4
Ba
le
ar
es
2
1
3
9
14
13
6
3
1
1
7
19
5
3
2
7
5
3
2
3
1
11
0
Ca
na
rie
s
1
3
4
21
16
17
5
1
1
7
2
5
12
8
7
2
2
2
3
1
12
0
Ca
nt
ab
ria
16
19
9
6
3
25
6
3
2
9
2
3
10
3
Ca
ta
lo
ni
a
5
2
13
21
12
11
7
8
3
5
6
1
5
4
6
10
2
8
8
4
4
6
2
1
8
1
6
6
5
3
2
18
5
C-
M
1
3
11
20
11
9
2
3
2
14
5
2
3
2
2
2
92
C-
M
6
10
14
14
10
1
4
3
3
7
9
7
4
5
3
2
2
3
1
3
11
1
E
xt
re
m
ad
ur
a
1
3
10
17
14
5
1
4
1
6
16
3
5
4
2
2
94
G
ali
ci
a
2
1
1
20
18
17
13
3
4
2
8
1
2
7
9
11
6
5
8
1
3
2
3
7
15
4
La
 R
io
ja
15
9
8
2
2
2
8
3
8
2
5
6
2
1
2
75
M
ad
rid
4
19
13
3
6
1
6
12
6
2
3
6
1
1
6
3
1
93
M
ur
ci
a
1
2
11
18
13
7
3
2
2
1
2
7
19
2
2
5
5
2
1
6
11
1
N
av
ar
ra
16
16
1
3
4
10
7
2
1
60
V
ale
nc
ia
3
1
3
14
21
15
19
4
5
6
2
7
7
3
4
6
5
1
1
2
1
1
13
1
P.
 V
as
co
2
1
15
19
6
2
21
7
9
6
2
1
2
93
To
ta
l
7
19
32
79
15
4
25
3
20
8
18
1
57
38
6
43
20
6
16
22
73
16
9
92
44
56
79
25
34
18
11
26
21
37
21
33
7
10
18
97
So
ur
ce:
 M
ini
str
y o
f P
ub
lic
 A
dm
ini
str
ati
on
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
 C
ed
ed
 p
ow
er
s b
y 
re
gi
on
 a
nd
 y
ea
r 
